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Article
The Most Dangerous Profession
REBECCA ROIPHE

This Article explores the history of the accounting profession,
expertise, and the administrative state. It explains how the government
gradually grew to rely on expertise not only as a way to master the
technical problems of the modern industrial world, but also to justify the
expansion of the administrative state. In theory, the professions would
provide a neutral source of value just as academics successfully
undermined the courts' ability to perform thisfunction. The Article argues
that government policy toward business regulation and the accounting
profession from the Progressive Era to the New Deal helped shape a
profession that was deeply tied to its business clients. Using this history as
a guide, this Article offers a unique perspective on two contemporary
debates concerning the expert's role in governance. First, by tracing the
roots of private governance in the early 20th century, this Article throws
doubt on the grand claims made by the fashionable new "private
governance" scholarship, announcing the imminent demise of the
administrativestate and the ascendance of private regulation. Second, in
recounting the history of the accounting profession, which is marked by
repeated attempts by the profession to gain federal recognition and
strengthen alliances between the profession and business, this Article
suggests a new way of assessing the recent efforts, embodied in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to restore a sense of independence to the
profession.
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The Most Dangerous Profession
REBECCA ROIPHE*

I. INTRODUCTION
On a Thursday in 1933, Felix Frankfurter asked James Landis to come
to Washington to help him draft the Federal Securities Act, promising that
they would be back in Cambridge by the following Monday when Landis
was scheduled to teach his next class.' Needless to say, Landis did not
make it back in time. Instead, he camped out with Benjamin Cohen and
Thomas Corcoran, two former Frankfurter students, in a room on the
seventh floor of the Carlton Hotel in Washington, D.C. 2 J.P. Morgan and
his staff, who had been summoned to testify at the Pecora hearings, were
staying in a suite just above theirs. As the reformer and the mogul made
their way to and from the Capitol, they frequently met in the elevator.
Landis mused that he "passed unnoticed, happy that our burrowing
in the
'4
structure of that empire had no noticeable reverberations above.

The New Deal government recognized the professions as a new
constituency and a new class of rulers. Experts had played a role in
governance for close to a century before the New Deal.' Even the early
state railroad agencies depended on engineers and economists to gather
information regarding rates and competition. They used this information
in a rather modest effort to persuade the railroads to reduce rates or avoid
disruptive competition. While the model for regulation remained limited

throughout the 19th century, in the 1890s, a group of intellectuals began
to attack party politics and promote a permanent governing body staffed
* Visiting Assistant Professor, Fordham University School of Law. B.A., Columbia University;
J.D., Harvard Law School; Ph.D., University of Chicago. I am grateful to the following for their
insightful comments: Jeff Colon, Matthew Diller, Caroline Gentile, Bruce Green, Jack Greenberg,
Benjamin Gruenstein, Michael Herz, Alexi Lahav, Michael Martin, Dan Meltzer, Russ Pearce, John
Pfaff, Hilary Sale, Gil Seinfeld, William Simon, Steve Thel, and Benjamin Zipursky.
1 DONALD A. RITCHIE, JAMES M. LANDIS: DEAN OF THE REGULATORS 43 (1980).
2James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the SecuritiesAct of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV
29, 39 (1959). Thomas Corcoran, born in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, received his LL.B. from Harvard
in 1925. MICHAEL E. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL 59-60 (1970).

After

serving as a law clerk for Associate Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Corcoran worked in a law firm in
New York where he specialized in corporate reorganization. Id. Benjamin Cohen, the son of a wealthy
Jewish family from Muncie, Indiana, received his Ph.D. in economics from the University of Chicago
in 1914 and his LL.B. from Harvard two years later. Id. He clerked for Judge Julian Mack on the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, worked for the United States Shipping Board
during World War I and later became counsel for the American Zionists. Id. at 59. After the war,
Cohen worked as a lawyer in New York, and like Corcoran, he specialized in corporate
reorganizations. Id.at 60.
3Landis, supra note 2, at 39. The Pecora hearings, led by Ferdinand J. Pecora, were conducted
by the Senate Committee on Banking and Commerce to investigate the causes of the Depression. See
JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL-STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 20-21 (1982).

4Landis, supra note 2, at 39.
'See infra Part II.A.I.
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by professionals. 6 This vision did not emerge fully formed for decades
to come, but World War I forced the government to rely increasingly on
experts within private industry and the professions to coordinate the
war effort.7 In the decade of peace and prosperity that followed,
government continued to rely on businessmen to govern. 8 After the
stock market crash of 1929, however, everyone agreed that business
could not be trusted to police its own behavior. 9 Regulatory agencies
grew in size and stature, interfering in new and unprecedented ways in
the market.' ° To reconcile the new invasion into the private realm with
the older deference to business, New Deal reformers had faith in the
value of professions not only for their technocratic expertise, but also as
a neutral source of value, which derived not just from the scientific
nature of their inquiry but also from their independent status." The
Securities Act of 1933 embodied this new faith in professionals by
that stood,
relying on, among others, the accounting profession-a body
12
at least theoretically, between government and business.
The accounting profession, however, had a somewhat checkered past.
The professional association was plagued with internal strife from its
inception in 1887.13 Battles between the national and state professional
bodies lasted for decades. Clamoring for recognition at the end of the 19th
century, accountants tried to persuade the new governmental agencies of
the virtues of their profession. 14 The government ignored the plea and
allowed bureaucrats to do the accounting that was necessary to regulate
business. When officials turned to the private realm, they consulted
business itself not the professionals. Excluded from both the intellectual
and practical efforts to coordinate the growingly complex capitalist system,
the profession allied itself with business, defining its mission against
government, rather than in a common pursuit of the public good. During
the First World War, accountants finally won a degree of recognition. 5
The accounting profession helped the government mobilize business and
6 See infra Part II.A. 1.
See generally ROBERT D. CUFF, THE WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD: BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT
RELATIONS DURING WORLD WAR 1(1973).

8 Robert D. Cuff, Herbert Hoover, The Ideology of Voluntarism and War OrganizationDuring
the Great War, 64 J. AM. HIST. 358, 358-62 (1977).
9 See RITCHIE, supra note 1, at 44; infra Part I.A.4.
'oSee infra Part II.B.4.
" See infra Part 11.B.4.
12 See infra Part ll.A.4.
The government relied on a group of professionals-accountants,
lawyers, and investment bankers-which came to be knows as gatekeepers. This article explores
accountants, one such group of professionals, as an example of this new reliance on experts to mediate
between government and business.
13 GARY JOHN PREVITS & BARBARA DUBIS MARINO, A HISTORY OF ACCOUNTANCY IN THE
UNITED STATES: THE CULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ACCOUNTING 31 (1998). See infra Part I..1.

14For

an extensive discussion of this topic, see infra Part II.B.2.
" See infra Part 1I.B.3.
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calculate the proper price for war contracts. "Public accountants," as they
became known, swarmed to the help of the wartime government and
people seemed to notice. 16 As soon as the war ended, however, the
accountants retreated from the public realm. They took their newfound
prestige and applied it to business rather than public service. Income tax
returns, audits, and consulting work all turned the profession's eye away
from government service toward business advising. 17 It was at this
moment, and against this backdrop, that James Landis and his colleagues
drafted the Securities Act of 1933, which required independent audits by
public accountants of the
financial statements of all companies offering
8
securities to the public.'
Landis was a young reformer, one of Frankfurter's protdgds. He was a
legal realist and a New Deal liberal, 19 part of what came to be known as
Roosevelt's "brain trust."20 These two intellectual commitments are, at
first glance, difficult to reconcile. The notion that legal doctrine is driven,
in large part, by the subjective musings of individual jurists threatened to
undermine the theoretical basis for the rule of law and with it the liberal
state. Almost from its inception, democracy was considered dangerous:
left to its own devices, the state would abuse its delegated powers and
begin to erode personal security and property. In theory, the rule of law
guards against this eventuality by constraining the state with mandates that
transcend the whims of those charged with applying them. The rule of law
would ensure that the government worked for the good of all, not the
passions of the few. 2 1 Legal realists, however, carefully
attacked and
22
undermined the existence of such independent norms.
Far from abandoning faith in the state, however, New Deal liberals like
Landis called for a more significant role for the government. As one of the
16 "Public accountants" refers to those who do not work for a particular business but rather
practice in a private firm. "Certified public accountants" are those who are certified to practice by their
state. PREVITS & DUBIS MERINO, supra note 13, at 24-25.
'7 See infra Part II.B.3.
'8 See infra Part I1.B.4.

19MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF

LEGAL ORTHODOXY 169-72 (1992); Mark Tushnet, Legal Scholarship:Its Causes andCure, 90 YALE
L.J. 1205, 1207 (1981).
20RITCHIE, supra note I, at 58.
21 C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO
LOCKE (1962). Historians of the revolutionary period have discussed the development of the notion of
the rule of law throughout the early period of the republic. See, e.g., JOHN PHILLIP REID,
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS (1986);
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969); Martin S.
Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 542-49
(1995); Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARv. L. REV. 4, 16-128 (2001). For a
discussion of how the notion of the rule of law evolved in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, see
HORWITZ, supranote 19.
22 HORWITZ, supra note 19, at 3-7.
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primary authors of the Securities Act of 1933, Landis defended the growth
of the administrative state, declaring the obsolescence of judges as "jacksof-all-trades and masters of none.' 23 In championing the role of agencies,
however, Landis and his colleagues had to provide a new source of
legitimacy for government, a new justification for the liberal state. In the
wake of the judge-based rule of law, they had to find a new guardian of the
public good.
Landis, like many of his contemporaries, filled this void with
objectivity, science and expertise, which would provide the ultimate
justification for the administrative state. When the government collided
with business, as Landis and J.P. Morgan's encounter nicely illustrates,
expertise-a neutral and almost invisible force-would be able to mediate.
Science would provide a necessary cushion between capital and labor,
private acquisitiveness and the excesses of democracy. The Securities
Acts of 1933 and 1934 provided for independent audits of financial
statements. 24 And this made sense given that the accountants had an expert
knowledge of financial reporting. The science of accountancy would
constitute a neutral arbiter between the state and business, guarding against
the excesses of democratic government while curbing the dangers of
unrestrained self-interest in the market. Science and expertise would
ensure that the government acted on behalf of the public good, rather than
the captains of industry. In short, the neutrality of expertise justified the
use of an independent profession
in business regulation just as it did the
25
administrative state generally.
By generating a seemingly neutral source of value, expertise could
provide a perfect theoretical basis for government expansion. The use of
an independent profession, however, was not foreordained. Landis could
have created a body of government accountants to regulate business
directly. He could have employed the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
which enforced the antitrust acts, or the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), which was created by the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934, to monitor the issuance of securities and conduct audits of
publicly traded companies. But he did not. The Securities Acts were
enacted after the stock market crash of 1929. They were approved after
Franklin Delano Roosevelt won the 1932 election in a landslide, but many
people still harbored a distaste for large government, a fear of democratic
excess and a suspicion that corruption would inevitably erode the
conscience of our leaders. The accountancy profession provided a
seemingly perfect compromise. Expertise combined with the profession's
status as a private group would preclude-at least theoretically-the
LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 31 (1938).
Exchange Act of 1934 § 10a(m)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000).
25 The government specifically declined to judge the merits of securities offerings. It relied, on
23 JAMES

24 Securities

the neutrality of accountants, among others, to do so instead. See infra Parts II.A.4, II.B.4.
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corruption and inertia of an overgrown bureaucracy, while guarding
against the self-interest of the market. Recognizing that private parties
govern each other, Landis assumed that the distinction between the private
and the public sphere would be blurred by this group that straddled the line
between the two.
Faith in the professions, however, proved to be near-sighted at best.
The securities laws pasted together faith in the expertise of the accounting
profession with skepticism about the objectivity of those same
professionals. The legislators themselves recognized that accountants were
both the source of the problem and the solution, and they created a
regulatory scheme that embodied that uneasy balance.26 This ambivalence
has survived today. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which regulates
corporate governance and strengthens reporting obligations, is premised on
the independence of the accounting profession while simultaneously
expressing a doubt as to whether such a mythical creature exists. 27 It
attempts to address the problem of accountants' lack of independence
without removing their critical role in the regulatory process. The Act
perpetuates the grave responsibility of independent audits, but
simultaneously polices the profession so closely as to communicate that the
accounting profession is not inherently independent. 28 At the same time, it
imposes rules designed to instill an otherwise absent independence in the
29
auditor.
This Article has three related goals. First, it contributes to the
understanding of the administrative state by analyzing how the New Deal
government both depended on the technocratic skill of experts to govern
and developed a related faith in the professions as a neutral source of
value. The audit provision of the Securities Acts recognized the
accounting profession and simultaneously transformed it into a semi-public
association. The drafters of the Securities Act of 1933 attempted to create
a hybrid, a body suspended between the public and private realms. They
did so to preserve the distinction between a public and a private interest,
relying on the profession to mediate between the two. Theoretically, the
profession replaced courts as a guardian of the public good, a way of
ensuring that experts in both government and business would work toward
the common good. The profession, not the courts, would ensure that
government would be insulated from the greed of the market and that
26See infra Part II.B.4.
27 See Jonathan Macey & Hillary A. Sale, Observations on the Role of Commodification,
Independence, and Governance in the Accounting Industry, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1167, 1182-83, 1185
(2003) (describing the creation of the "Public Company Accounting Oversight Board").
28See id. (discussing the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms, and the limits on accountant's independence).
29 See id. at 1182-86 (arguing that it is the internal structure of the large accounting firm that has

contributed to the lack of independence in the profession).
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capital would not be transformed into the tool of the politically powerful.
Ideally, however, Landis imagined a world in which the public and the
private would blur as experts and professionals suffused the ranks of both.
Second, this Article puts recent proposals to use private and semipublic bodies to regulate business in historical context. 30 This scholarship,
known as "private governance" literature, echoes both the 1920s reliance
on businesses to regulate themselves and aspects of New Deal regulation.
By casting these arguments in historical context, this Article isolates what
is, in fact, new about this scholarship and throws doubt on their
proponents' claim to espouse a novel turn to private regulation. While the
use of private and semi-public bodies has deep roots in the history of
regulation, proponents of private governance have seemingly abandoned
the faith in expertise of an earlier generation. 3 1 Thus, scholars suggest that
we open the regulatory doors to anyone who might have some interest or
knowledge about a problem and then devise new methods to ensure that
the process results in policies that are in the public interest. 32 Ironically,
many of these scholars rely heavily on professions and other expert
associations, such as accrediting agencies, to ensure that the private
participants in the regulatory process serve the public good. This history
provides a cautionary tale, warning against any naked claim that
professional associations will provide a check against private actions.
Finally, this Article illustrates that Landis's New Deal vision was built
on an illusion (or a misplaced optimism) about professional independence.
The accounting profession had come of age as the regulatory state itself
was just emerging. Excluded from the realm of politics until the Great
War, public accountants never truly developed a public ethic. 33 To the
contrary, they distanced themselves from the government and aligned more
closely with business as the Depression drew near. 34 The critical piece of
this New Deal puzzle, professional independence, develops over time in
relation to government policy; it cannot be created overnight by a wave of
the legislative wand. This uncontroversial conclusion-that a public ethic
30 See generally Symposium, New Forms of Governance: Ceding Power to Private Actors, 49

UCLA L. REv. 1687 (2002); Symposium, Public Values in an Era ofPrivatization, 116 HARV. L. REV.
1212 (2003). See also Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 267 (1998); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public
Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv 543 (2000) [hereinafter Freeman, The Private Role in Public
Governance]; Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV.
I (1997) [hereinafter Freeman, Collaborative Governance]; Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life
of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029 (2005).
31 For a discussion of the collapse of the faith in expertise as a neutral source of value, see
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1669, 167693 (1975).
32 Freeman, Collaborative Governance, supra note 30.
33 Public ethic, in this article, refers not merely to a rhetoric concerning service but rather social
norms within a profession that continually reinforce a sense that the goal of the profession is to serve
and help develop a common good.
3 See infra notes 327-31.
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is built over time not by fiat-suggests a new way to look at recent rules
that govern gatekeepers.
Part II of this Article reviews the intellectual context in which the
securities laws were enacted, demonstrating both the increasingly
entrenched reliance on the expert in general and the evolution of one such
group of professionals, the accountants. With reference to the evolving
role of the expert in the regulatory structure, it explains the development of
the accounting profession throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries,
emphasizing the notion of independence both within the profession itself
and by government regulators. Part III of the Article uses this history to
analyze two contemporary debates concerning the role that the expert
should play in governance, both in the regulation of business by
accountants and in the regulatory scheme more generally.
35

II. BUILDING THE IRON CAGE

Reliance on experts to govern is deeply ingrained in American history.
After the Civil War, the government grew committed to minimal intrusions
in the private life of individuals and the market.36 Thus, experts played a
quiet role, a supporting part in an (at least theoretically) unimportant plot.
As the industrial economy matured in the late 19th century, regulation
became more prevalent and the government grew to rely on expertise to
master the problems of the modern industrial world.37 Gradually, the state
turned to the independent expert not only to meet the practical problems of
the modern world, but also to fill a theoretic vacuum. This vacuum arose
as lawyers, judges, politicians, and academics all questioned the role of the
courts in ensuring the rights of all against the power of the few: both the
market and politics were characterized by coercion.38 The professions
could ensure neutrality and accountability as the distinction between the
private and the public began to blur. Thus, as government intruded more
in the market and relied more on businesses to regulate themselves,
professions would ensure that both private and public actors were working
toward a common good. Because the profession was so young and
because it competed with government officers, accountancy, unlike some
of the other professions, did not gain recognition until well into the 20th
century. The Securities Acts thus endowed a grave responsibility of
35The sociologist Max Weber used the term "iron cage" to refer to a bureaucracy that has grown
so complex that it imprisons the soul. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF
CAPITALISM
181 (Talcott Parsons trans., 1958).
36
WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW & REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA (1996).
37 Id.; WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW AND
IDEOLOGY INAMERICA, 1886-1937 (1998).
38 HORWITZ, supra note 19, at 33-65.
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preserving the public good on a profession that had grown deeply tied to its
business clients.
A. Expertise and Regulation in American History
This section analyzes the history of regulation, demonstrating how the
state began to see expertise and ultimately the independent professions as
the panacea for the ills of the industrializing world.3 9 In the progressive
era, a new professional elite promoted a plan for an administrative state.4 °
While the proposal gained support among intellectual circles, it did not
truly succeed for years to come. During World War I, the Wilson
administration relied increasingly on both businessmen and professionals
to persuade industry to serve the needs of a state at war.4' With peace, the
coordination of business efforts was quickly replaced with a conservative
corporatism. 42 The government not only relied on business to regulate
itself but delegated a certain amount of legislative power to organized trade
groups.43 Experts did not lose their prestige but they fled from government
service. 44 Politicians relied on experts within the industries to govern
themselves. Eventually, the New Deal implemented a new system in
which state power would be divided among private, public, and semipublic experts-agencies, business, and professionals-who would work
together to manage the chronically sick economy. Expertise would
permeate the public and the private realm not just to solve the practical
problems of industrial America but also to provide a neutral source of
value, immune to the self-interest of the market and the corruption of party
politics.
39 William Nelson argues that the administrative state grew up as the ideal of protecting the
minority from being overwhelmed by majoritarian self-rule receded. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE ROOTS
OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY, 1830-1900, at 1-2 (1982). For a consistent contemporary analysis of
the birth of the administrative state as a response to industrialization and the extension of democratic
impulses, see LANDIS, supra note 23, at 6-46.
40 See infra Part Il.A.4.
41 See infra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
42 Corporatism is a political system in which the govemment gives legislative power to private

groups. The groups or associations then assume a critical role in making decisions for the state. See
infra Part lI.A.4.
43 Ellis Hawley, Three Facets of Hooverian Associationalism Lumber, Aviation, and Movies,
1921-1930, in REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE: HISTORICAL ESSAYS 95 (Thomas K. McCraw Ed., 1981).
4 In general, the word "expert" refers to anyone with special skill or knowledge gained from
study or experience. This section seeks to illustrate how the term itself evolved throughout the last
century. In the early period a businessman would be considered an "expert" in his field. By the New
Deal, experts were those not simply with some technocratic skill but also with at least a claim to
independence and neutrality. For a discussion of the development of objectivity in American history,
see JAMES T. KLOPPENBERG, UNCERTAIN VICTORY: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND PROGRESSIVISM IN

EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1870-1920 (1986); PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE
"OBJECTIVITY QUESTION" AND THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION (1988).
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1. Regulation in the 19th Century
In the early 19th century, the United States was governed by a
patrician elite, comprised mostly of lawyers. By the middle of the century,
the industrial economy matured and party politics displaced this uniquely
American aristocracy. Small agencies with limited missions emerged to
regulate railroads, and later public utilities. 45 These early agencies tended
to gather information and use reports to persuade the regulated industry
that it was in its interest to comply with government policy. 46 Experts took
the helm in this limited capacity. By the 1870s, a new class of
professionals joined progressive reformers to critique party politics and
promoted a permanent bureaucracy staffed with experts instead.
In pre-Jacksonian America, the government comprised a class of
professionals, a fairly stable patrician elite. As Alexis de Tocqueville
observed, American lawyers, like European aristocrats, ruled with
moderation and reflection.4 7 These leaders largely assumed that
government intervention in the economy was necessary to support
growth.4 8 Subsidies and land grants were all part of a political agenda,
albeit a somewhat incoherent one. Government intervened in favor of the
incipient industrial interests in order to prevent deleterious competition and
promote growth. According to pre-classical ideology, the business
corporation itself was a creature born to be regulated.4 9
By the time experts began to take significant part in governance, the
prevailing political theory dictated a limited role. 50 Fueled by Andrew
Jackson's egalitarian philosophy and Adam Smith's laissez-faire
economics, classical liberalism despised government intervention. 5' Early
classicists assumed that when the government acted, it did so on behalf of
the powerful business interests.52 The proponents of classical liberal
thought favored a limited role for government, reasoning that if the
45 Avi HOOGENBOOM & OLIVE HOOGENBOOM, A HISTORY OF THE ICC: FROM PANACEA
TO
PALLIATIVE 6-8 (1976).
46 THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION: CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMs, Louis D.
BRANDEIS, JAMES M. LANDIS, ALFRED E. KAHN 1-57 (1984).
47 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 290 (Henry Reeve trans., 1958).
48 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW: 1836-1937, at 11 (1991).
49 See id.at 12; WIECEK, supra note 37.
50 STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL

ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920, at 32 (1982). Not incidentally, by the 1820s, the legal
profession was losing control over its membership. The expansion of the population on the one hand
and the pressure for a more democratic politics on the other put strains on a profession defined by the
informal ties of a small elite group of lawyers. Id. at 33.
51 Classical legal theory and laissez-faire liberalism had myriad intellectual origins. For a
thorough discussion of their sources, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The PoliticalEconomy of Substantive
Due Process,
40 STAN. L. REV. 379 (1988).
52
Id. at 321. See also WILLIAM NELSON, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY 1830-1900,

at 152 (1982).
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government remained neutral, the powerful and wealthy businesses would
lose their greatest ally. 53 Competition
would restore freedom and, to some
54
measure, equality to the polity.
In 1776, Adam Smith wrote that regulatory authority "would no-where
be so dangerous as in the hands of a man who had the folly and
presumption enough to fancy himself fit to exercise it." 55 It took a while to
catch on, but 100 years later, most American judges 6 and political
economists tended to agree. 57 The ethic of a self-regulating market where
individuals acted in their own self-interest and the state remained a neutral
arbiter prevailed-for a time. In this universe, regulation was seen as an
aberration, a necessary evil, as classical liberal theory assumed that the
market generally worked well.5 8
As the century drew to a close, however, the political economy of
classical liberalism faltered. Society grew more interdependent and
consumer markets for standardized products became larger and larger.
Small and simple enterprises evolved into complex units forming what
became known as "managerial ' 59 or "corporate" 6° capitalism. The
growing disparity in wealth, the obvious inequities in bargaining power,
and the social struggles that resulted all shook the foundations of Adam
Smith's laissez-faire state and exposed the inadequacy of courts to resolve
the problems of the modem industrial world. Specifically, the economic
panic of 1873 undermined
the basic tenet of classicism that the market was
61
benign and just.
13Hovenkamp, supra note 51, at 321; NELSON, supra note
14HOVENKAMP, supra note 48; MCCRAw, supra note 46,

52, at 152.
at 10.

55ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS,
bk.
2, ch. 2 (Liberty Classics 1981) (1776). See also ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE
INTERESTS: POLITICAL ARGUMENTS FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH (1977).

56 Most judges in the late 19th century adhered to a judicial theory that embodied
the political
economy of classical liberalism. This jurisprudence is commonly referred to as "classical legal
thought." Justice Stephen Field's jurisprudence provides a good example of this integration of classical
liberal theory into legal discourse. Amidst increasing hostility, Justice Mahlon Pitney carried classical
legal thought into the 20th century. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 40-42 (1915) (Day &
Hughes, JJ., dissenting). For a discussion of the definition of classical legal thought, see HORwITz,
supra note 19, at 3-31; WIECEK, supra note 37. For a discussion of the development of classical
political economy in America in contrast to Britain, see Hovenkamp, supra note 51, at 402-10.
s'Francis Wayland, Francis Bowen, and Henry Carey, among others, developed American
classical political economy in the 19th century. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 48, at 36-41. By 1885,
economists were developing anti-laissez-faire theories that would become popular several decades
later. SKOWRONEK, supra note 50, at 132.
58
5 See generally NOVAK, supra note 36.
9 ALFRED D. CHANDLER JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN
BUSINESS (1977).
6 JAMES LIVINGSTON, PRAGMATISM AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION,

1850-1941 (1994).
61 The economic panic of 1873 was one of a series of depressions at the end of the century.
It
began in 1873 when a prominent Philadelphia bank Jay Cooke & Co. declared bankruptcy. This set off
a number of other bankruptcies and culminated in the collapse of the American economy.

The New

York Stock Exchange closed for ten days, and 89 of the 364 railroads declared bankruptcy. See JAMES
WILLARD HURST, THE LEGAL HISTORY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1774-1970 (1973).
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The biggest failure in the American economy at the time was the
railroad industry. After the Civil War, railroads transformed the United
States. The country had been loosely tied together with broken down roads
and waterways. As the geographic reach expanded westward, railroads
provided the only way to connect producers, merchants, and consumers.
But without federal coordination, railroads grew up in a haphazard way.
States generally granted subsidies to privately-owned rail systems to
promote growth. Soon, the railroads
comprised a tangled mess of
62
routes.
overlapping
and
competing
Early rate regulation largely occurred at the state level. With the
exception of the Granger laws, which dictated fixed rates, regulation at this
time was generally weak. Early railroad commissioners had faith that
coercion was not necessary. With the proper information at their
fingertips, they would be able to persuade the railroads to do what was
best-knowledge and truth would prevail; progress would inevitably
follow when the interests of all the affected groups were harmonized.63
While their role was necessarily quite limited, experts began to take a part
in governance.
As the century drew on, some state agencies took more active steps by
setting maximum rates for public utilities. 64 As the state commissions and
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) were trying to impose order
on the railroads, other companies just kept growing bigger. The great
cartels began to emerge as businesses combined with their competitors
through associations or mergers. Congress enacted the Sherman Antitrust
62

Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in HistoricalPerspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1197

(1986). Rate conferences were meetings among railroads to set rates and pooling agreements consisted
of complex efforts to share equipment or traffic and fix the price accordingly.
63 MCCRAw, supra note 54, at 1-57.
64 Id. at 61-62; Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalismand the
Railroad Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1017, 1059 (1988). The Supreme Court essentially mandated that
agencies determine rates by assessing the costs plus profit for the railroads, a system that required the
expert service of accountants and statisticians. Ironically, in exercising its authority to determine the
scope of regulation, the Supreme Court expanded the role of what would become its greatest
competitor, the expert. In Smyth v. Ames, the Union Pacific Railroad challenged a Nebraska statute that
set the maximum rates the corporation could charge for hauling freight. 169 U.S. 466, 470 (1898). The
Court ruled that the state was entitled to fix rates but that it must ensure that the railroad receive a
reasonable return on "the fair value of the property being used for the public." Id. Smyth came after a
long line of cases in which the Court limited the power and discretion of the ICC. E.g., ICC v.
Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex. Pac. Ry. Co., 167 U.S. 479 (1897) (rejecting the ICC's ability to set
rates for railroads); ICC v. Alabama Midland Ry., 168 U.S. 144, 163-65 (1897) (retaining the ability of
the courts to review de novo agency determinations regarding rate discrimination); United States v.
Trans-Miss. Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897) (rejecting the ICC's toleration of inter-railroad pricing
agreements). For a discussion of the interaction between the ICC and the courts, see SKOWRONEK,
supra note 50, at 152-60. For a contemporary account, see Paul J. Miranti, Jr., The Mind's Eye of
Reform: The ICC's Bureau of Statistics and Accounts and a Vision of Regulation, 1887-1940, 63 BUS.
HIST. REv. 469, 485 (1989) (citing CARL McFARLAND, THE JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION AND THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, 1920-1930 (1933)).
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Act in 1890 to address the problem. The solution was vague, and, perhaps
as a result, the Department of Justice let the Act linger, bringing so few
enforcement actions as to render the law virtually irrelevant. 65 The
Sherman Act failed to address the central question of whether bigness was
an evil in itself or only when used for unfair advantage. Culminating in
Standard Oil Co. v. United States,66 the Supreme Court opted for the latter
and corporations continued to expand in size and power.67 In this context,
Theodore Roosevelt became President, and the collective voice of
progressive reformers grew louder.
2.

The ProgressiveEra and the Idea of the Expert

Progressive reformers of different stripes-labor reformers, women's
rights activists, health care reformers to name a few--developed a new
rhetoric at the turn of the 20th century, demanding government
intervention in the economy. Reformers called for diverse and conflicting
solutions to the social, political, and economic ailments of the day.61 One
thing that united the disparate group of reformers was the language of
social efficiency and monopoly-bashing. 69 The diatribes against the
concentration of power in the hands of the few had moved from the
periphery-the populists, workers, and socialists-to the mainstream.70
But the message was watered down in the process. As their name would
indicate, the progressives were optimists. Most had faith that science,
knowledge, and truth would harmonize conflicting interests and lead us
71
happily into the modern era.
Their theory of regulation may not have differed much from their
predecessors, but the structure did. The progressives who promoted a new
state were a special breed, a new intellectual and professional class that
was beginning to gain some prominence in the late 19th century. The first
professional societies emerged in the middle of the century-the American
65MCCRAw, supra note 54, at 114.
66Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 57-61 (1911).
67 WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE

SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 117-28 (1965). Some historians have argued that the Sherman Antitrust
Act ironically caused the mergers at the turn of the century. The first successful prosecutions under the
Sherman Antitrust Act targeted "loose" combination or cartels. The Supreme Court overturned the first
attempt to regulate "tight" combinations, or mergers, when it concluded that manufacturing is not
commerce. Businesses inferred that they could avoid the reach of the law by merging rather than
colluding. HOVENKAMP, supra note 48, at 242-43. More importantly, state corporate law failed to
develop a policy regarding anti-competitive mergers. Both federal and state governments relied instead
on the common law doctrine against contracts in restraint of trade. This doctrine was quite effective at
policing agreements between firms but at the same time, it was agnostic about agreements within a
single firm. Id. at 243.
6This
is reflected in wage and labor legislation, municipal reform movements, and juvenile court
proposals. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 242 (1955).
69

70

Daniel T. Rodgers, In Search of Progressivism, 10 REvs. AM. HIST. 113, 123 (1982).

Id.

7 id
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Medical Association founded in 184772 and the American Bar Association
in 1878 73-amidst a great surge of voluntary associations in America.74 In
1865, a small group of these reformers established the American Social
Science Association, which provided organization for the emerging class
of professional academics. 75 By the end of the century, states began to
recognize the professions by enacting licensing laws and requiring
examinations by new licensing boards. 76 In the first decade of the 20th
century, law and medicine both began to develop their own codes of
professional ethics."
The growth in scope of the market rendered most transactions
impersonal and thus unpredictable.78
Experts, according to the
progressives, could replace the local communities, which had previously
monitored the market.7 9 Many progressive reformers viewed expertise as
the only way to restore morality to the market. Progressive reformers
gradually developed a faith that bureaucratic organization, staffed by
experts could coordinate the warring factions of the body politic and
release the positive energy within the social organism.8 0 Intellectuals
condemned the despotism of the party machines and slowly but forcefully
81
asserted that an apparatus run by professionals was the only solution.
Lawyers, economists, and social scientists joined the hue and cry against
the corruption of party politics and championed an administrative structure,
which, in E.L. Godkin's words, would possess "finish, efficacy, and
72

Maxwell H. Bloomfield, Law: The Development of a Profession, in THE PROFESSIONS IN

AMERICAN HISTORY 40 (Norman 0. Hatch ed., 1988).
73 Ronald L. Numbers, The Fall and Rise of the American Medical Profession, in THE
PROFESSIONS IN AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 72, at 56.
74 ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER: 1877-1920, at 117 (1967). The "organization

synthesis" historians, as they came to be known, argued against a previous group of scholars who had
viewed the professions as a sinister tool of capitalist interests. DAVID F. NOBLE, AMERICA BY DESIGN:
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE RISE OF CORPORATE CAPITALISM 44 (1977); Jerold S.Auerbach, A
StratrfiedProfession, in LAWYERS' ETHICS AND THE PURSUIT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE: A CRITICAL READER
79,79-80 (Susan D. Carle ed., 2005).
73 THOMAS L. HASKELL, THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE AMERICAN
SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION AND THE NINETEENTH CENTURY CRISIS OF AUTHORITY 97 (1977);
DOROTHY ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE (1991). While enacting barriers to entry

into the professions, these groups simultaneously saw themselves as pioneers of liberal reform. Id.
76 MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1776-1876,
at 341
(1976).
77Susan D. Carle, Lawyers' Duty to Do Justice: A New Look at the History of the 1908 Canons,
24 LAW & SOc. INQUIRY 1, 6-7 (1999).
78See HOFSTADTER, supra note 68, at 224-25.
79 WIEBE, supra note 74, at 129 (discussing the middle class's development of a new identity
within the professions and their subsequent efforts to ameliorate the effects of the market).
goSee Rodgers, supra note 69, at 117-18, 125.
81HOFSTADTER, supra note 68, at 257-59,265; SKOWRONEK, supra note 50, at 43.
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permanence. ' 82

As Woodrow Wilson explained in 1887, the country needs
a "body of thoroughly trained officials serving during good behavior." 83 In
the spirit of a whole generation of intellectuals, 84 Wilson insisted that
governance must be separated from politics: "Bureaucracy can exist only
where the whole service of the state is removed from the common political
life of the people, its chiefs as well as its rank and file." 85 Turn-of-thecentury intellectuals like Thorstein Veblen argued that the expert must take
the helm because technology was critical to the future of the country.8 6
Their message would not truly take root for decades to come.
As the intelligentsia was promoting a permanent bureaucracy, some
historians argue that the professions served to maintain order amidst the
conflict between capital and labor, which surged as a largely decentralized
weak state attempted to tame the effects of corporate capitalism.
Specifically, Robert Wiebe, Louis Galambos and others have suggested
that by the end of the 19th century, change occurred primarily through the
interaction of organizations-networks
of hierarchical structures of
87
private.
and
public
both
authority
Despite the growing enthusiasm for expertise, the process took some
time to emerge. In 1903, Roosevelt persuaded Congress to create a federal
agency called the Bureau of Corporations. 8 Embodying the prevailing
attitude toward regulation, the new unit consisted of lawyers and
economists who studied and gathered information on the financial
leviathans of the day. 89 The Bureau of Corporations, like the early state
railroad commissions, expressed faith that knowledge, publicity, and
education could persuade business to compete in an efficient and
benevolent fashion. 90 Meanwhile, business kept getting bigger. The
government used the Sherman Antitrust Act to restrict cartels, but both
state corporation law and the federal government allowed most mergers to
82

SKOWRONEK, supra note 50, at 42 (quoting E.L. Godkin, The Duty of Educated Men in a

Democracy, in PROBLEMS OF MODERN DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ESSAYS 199, 219
(1896)).
83 Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197, 216 (1887).
8 See SKOWRONEK, supra note 50, at 42.
85Wilson, supra note 83, at 217.
See THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE ENGINEERS AND THE PRICE SYSTEM 131-33 (1921).
WIEBE, supra note 74, at 127-28; Louis Galambos, The Emerging OrganizationalSynthesis in
Modern American Business History, 44 Bus. HIST. REV. 279, 280 (1970). This thesis came into some
disrepute as social historians argued that individuals and disorganized groups had agency and effected
historic change. Historians who adopt this critique either explicitly or implicitly are too numerous to
catalogue. See, e.g., GEORGE CHAUNCEY, GAY NEW YORK: GENDER, CULTURE, AND THE MAKINGS OF
THE GAY MALE WORLD, 1890-1940 (1994); Regina G. Kunzel, Fallen Women, Problem Girls:
Unmarried Mothers and the Professionalizationof Social Work 1890-1945, in FAMILIES BY LAW: AN
ADOPTION READER 29, 32 (Naomi R. Calm & Joan Heifetz Hollinger eds., 1994).
88Rabin, supra note 62, at 1219.
89MCCRAW, supra note 54, at 80.
6
87

90Rabin, supra note 62, at 1219.
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slip by. 91 Progressive reformers fought against big business. Drawing on a
tradition that stretched back to Jackson, muckrakers like Louis D. Brandeis
railed against the trusts warning
that business had become so large that the
92
nation's soul was in jeopardy.
While the government was struggling with what to do about big
business, Congress grew to accept a more expansive role for agencies such
as the ICC. In 1906, for example, the Hepburn Act gave the Commission
power to set maximum rates for railroads.93
Perhaps because they
considered railroads, unlike industry, to be "affected with a public
interest," 94 legislators were more willing to expand the role of the ICC
while they still disagreed about whether there should even be an agency to
oversee industry. 9596 The public outcry against monopolies kept the issue
alive nonetheless.
As the new agencies grew, however, the courts jealously guarded their
role in governing. In 1914, Wilson introduced two bills, one to amend the
substantive antitrust laws and another to create a commission to regulate
interstate trade.97 The Federal Trade Commission Act delegated authority
to a new commission to "investigate, publicize, and prohibit all 'unfair
methods of competition.' 9 8 Despite this grand mandate, the FTC got off
to an inauspicious start.99 Amidst a relatively severe economic downturn,
the administration was reluctant to be perceived as anti-business and the
agency languished under ineffectual leadership. 10 0 The Supreme Court
emasculated the FTC even further. In FederalTrade Commission v. Gratz,
the Court ruled that it was the role of the courts, not the Commission, to
9' See Morton Keller, The Pluralist State: American Economic Regulation in Comparative
Perspective, 1900-1930, in REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE: HISTORICAL ESSAYS, supra note 43, at 56,

69-70 (discussing the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence which effectively limited the
reach of the Sherman Act to actual movement of products across state lines and did not include
corporate consolidation per se).
92See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 46-50
(1914); Rodgers, supranote 69, at 123.
93 McCRAw, supra note 54, at 62. For a discussion of the political debates leading up to the
Hepburn Act and its predecessor the Elkins Act of 1903, see SKOWRONEK, supra note 50, at 250-51.
9 See Rabin, supra note 62, at 1208, 1210.
95PARRISH, supra note 2; SELIGMAN, supranote 3.

9 MCCRAw, supra note 54, at 61-62, 64-65; G. Cullom Davis, The Transformation of the
Federal Trade Commission, 1914-1929,49 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 437, 438 (1963).
97MCCRAw, supra note 54, at 119.
98 Davis, supra note 96, at 438. Prosecutions under the Sherman Act increased under Roosevelt
and Taft, and Brandeis helped ensure that it was central to the presidential election in 1912. MCCRAw,
supra note 54, at 110-1l, 115. The initial bill supported a much weaker commission modeled on the

early state railroad commissions. The purpose of this commission would have been to gather
information rather than actively engage in determining unfair trade practices. Id. at 118.
" MCCRAw, supra note 54, at 125.
1' Id at 126-27.
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determine what comprised an "unfair method of competition."''01 Gratz
represented the growing hostility of the Court toward the incipient
administrative state. Regulation in America had been largely a judicial
function. The Court, still mired in classical legal theory, repeatedly
invoked the doctrine that the executive had impermissibly undercut its
02
authority to thwart the efforts of the new administrative tribunals.'
By the end of the first decade of the 20th century, there was a growing
consensus that government would need to coordinate business activity, but
the model did not stray too far from its roots in the early railroad regulatory
commissions. Government was there to gather information, to persuade,
and cajole. In industries with closer ties to the public, like the railroads
and public utilities, state and even federal government would police the
boundaries of acceptable behavior but within that wide swath, business
was free to roam. The government began to recognize expertise as the
means to this rather modest end and courts made sure that judges, not
experts, defined their role in governing.
3.

World War L the 1920s, and the Cult of the Expert

During World War I, the government relied on experts to coordinate
the war effort. 0 3 While Woodrow Wilson depended on experts to govern,
the wartime government did not distinguish between business experts and
the independent professions. °4 The government depended on the
technocratic knowledge of both businessmen and the professions
indiscriminately. It did not yet value the neutrality of expertise, unmoored
from industry. The American government managed to coordinate industry
and harness the economy without resort to a massive wartime
bureaucracy. 0 5 Herbert Hoover, serving as head of the United States Food
Administration, called for voluntary participation of civilians and
businesses in the wartime effort, rather than mandating rationing, price
fixing or production quotas.'0° With a masterful appeal to patriotism, the
United States managed to persuade business to comply.' 7 Using the
model that dated to the early railroad commission, Hoover employed
experts-both businessmen and professional-to write reports and urge
l0'FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421,427 (1920). For a review of Supreme Court decisions limiting the
scope of the FTC's regulatory powers in the Progressive Era, see Rabin, supra note 62, at 1232-33. At
the same time, the Court extended the reach of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Id. at 1233.
102The Court continued to use this theory to thwart regulatory efforts through the early New Deal.
The last case that invoked the theory of executive delegation was Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). HORWrrz, supra note 19, at 223.
103 CUFF, supranote 7, at 15.
04 Id.passim.
05Cuff, supra note 8, at 358.
06 See id at 359, 369-70.
107Id. at 358.
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business to conform to certain recommendations
until business finally
08
bowed to the government's agenda.'
The wartime attitude toward business drew on several Progressive Era
proposals. As early as 1914, businessmen and politicians alike began to
promote the ideal of association, organization, and industrial selfgovernment. 10 9 In their view, the government should allow industries to
form permanent associations to analyze and organize their activities." 0
These organizations would then function on their own without government
supervision.'
Administrators called for the extension of business
efficiency to the national organism'12 In other words, they believed that
business was the most efficient organization and therefore, all political and
social institutions should take business as their model.
Like most political economists of the time, Hoover believed that
production was the key to progress. In order to increase production,
private enterprises had to "rationalize" their systems. Essentially, he
advocated the use of knowledge, hierarchy, and organization to maximize
output and minimize waste." 3 The best way to achieve this result would
be for businesses to form associations in discrete industries. Government
would then actively assist in coordinating their effort to achieve rational
114
and efficient order.
Hoover and his aides preached a gospel of scientific management."'
They called for economic rather than political government. 16 Politicians
working through antitrust bureaus or regulatory commissions were
necessarily inefficient and corrupt, but experts coordinating financial
institutions-determining prices, production quotas, or wages-would be
quite the opposite. 117 The professions saw the opportunity to gain the
10s
Id.at 358-62.
109
Hawley, Three Facets of Hooverian Associationalism:Lumber, Aviation, and Movies, 19211930, supra note 43, at 95, 98.
'10 MCCRAW, supra note 54, at 147. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 57, at 321-22 (discussing the
trade association movement and the efforts of its leaders to convince the Supreme Court that the
associations would help business avoid excess capacity and waste).
111McCRAw, supra note 54, at 147.
113

By the turn of the century, many industrialists were adopting principles of "scientific

management," also known as "Taylorism," after Frederick Winslow Taylor. WIEBE, supra note 74, at
15 1. Taylor argued that subdividing tasks would speed up production. It would create the greatest
product and service with the minimum of cost and time. See CHANDLER, supra note 59, at 275-76.
Hollis Godfrey, a Harvard educated engineer, applied the principles of Taylorism to prepare industry
for war. He proposed forming a Council of National Defense that would gather information and
persuade manufacturers to divide tasks so as to create the most efficient output for the wartime
government. CUFF, supra note 7, at 27-29.
114 Rabin, supra note 62, at 1237.
115 Ellis Hawley, HerbertHoover, The Commerce Secretariat,and the Vision of an "Associative
State, " 1921-1928, 64 J. AM. HIST. 116, 117 (1974).
116Id. at 126.
117 Ross, supra note 75, at 390-404.
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years."l 8

Before
status and recognition to which they had aspired for
America even entered the war, they seized the moment. In 1916, two
prominent gynecologists and leaders of the medical profession, Franklin
Martin and Franklin Simpson, formed the Committee of American
Physicians for Medical Preparedness. 19 The new organization developed
catalogs of the country's medical resources and created ties with the
military to help prepare for war. 120 Not only did the professions court the
government, the government also approached the professions. 12 ' For
instance, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels conferred with Thomas
Edison in creating the Naval Consulting Board (NCB), a small body of
inventors and engineers who would evaluate civilian and military
inventions. 22 The board was ultimately led by the popular science hero
Edison himself. 123 The NCB assessed the nation's capacity for munitions
production by preparing a full inventory of industry.' 24 It used this
information to devise plans to increase that capacity and train each industry
to produce the munitions that were most suited to its resources. 25 The
with
NCB tried to convince business that private interest was aligned
26
public demand, that the traditional adversaries were, in fact, allies. 1
In a very real way, the private and the public realm had begun to
merge. The government needed the resources of the market to carry on a
massive war effort and it used experts within industries to manage the new
endeavor. 27 In establishing the Council of National Defense (the
Counsel), Wilson took his cue from the NCB. 128 The Council's function
was to investigate and make recommendations regarding railroad building,
highway location, and the availability of military supplies. 29 The Council,
comprised of government officials, soon appointed fourteen engineers,
which would
scientists, and businessmen to an Advisory Commission,
0
determine how to mobilize industrial resources for war.13
Once the United States entered the war, government officials relied
primarily on businessmen to build bridges between the state and the
nation's economy.' 31 Professionals continued to help but they did not
occupy the center stage as they had hoped. By 1917, it was clear that the
118CUFF,

supranote 7, at 41.

"9Id. at 13-14.
20
' 1d. at 14.
121Id. at 16.
12Id. at 15.
123Id. at 15-16.
24
1 1d. at21.
25
1 Id.
26

1 Id. at 23.

127Cuff, supra note

8, at 358-59.
CUFF, supra note 7, at 25, 34.
1 Id. at 36.
30
1 Id. at 39.
131See id at 94.
128See
29
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Council was too weak and ineffectual. 132 Bernard Baruch, the Wall Street
tycoon, ultimately displaced the engineers and scientists, with his practical
plan for dealing directly with industry leaders. 133 Wilson conceived of the
War Industries Board (WIB) as a screen between private and public,
insuring that private industrial power was accountable to public
authority. 134 The WIB created a bureaucracy that was both public and
private. 135 The public piece, however, was distinct from the regulatory
infrastructure, staffed with volunteers from the private sector or "dollar-ayear men."' 136 The private bureaus, like the war service committee, were
chosen by industry associations but the line between private and public
blurred as the government delegated regulatory authority to the private
bureaus. 137
Throughout the war, professionals worked alongside
businessmen in gathering information and coordinating the plans necessary
to conduct the war.
Hoover carried his theory of regulation into the post-war era, but
unlike many of his counterparts on the continent, he emphasized limits on
government encroachment on economic liberty. 138 Bureaucracies were too
often a sad mixture of incompetence and inefficiency. They jealously
guarded their meager authority with little to show for it.'3 9 Government
could advocate standardization, planning and rationality, which would
guide private associations from bitter competition to progressive
cooperation. The vision began to take form as trade associations grew and
Hoover took the helm of the new Commerce Department to aid business in
its self-government. 140 Government bureaus grew up to assist private
associations in increasing efficiency. Even the FTC joined in, holding
"trade-practice conferences" to help business groups rationalize their
activities. 14 1 The experiment in associationalism, however, could not fully
32

1 Id. at 104.
133See id at 145-46.
34

1

Id. at 104.

' See SKOWRONEK, supra note 50, at 234.
136

Id.at 236.

137
Hawley, supra note 109, at 95, 98. Hawley argues that the 1920s did not constitute a return to

laissez-faire liberalism, but rather the implementation of corporatist ideals developed during the First
World War. Id.at 121.
138See Hawley, supra note 115, at 117-18.
'

39

See id.at 126.

See id. at i17-21. Hoover's initiatives met with some opposition from President Harding's
Attorney General Harry Daugherty. Daugherty launched a new antitrust campaign targeting any trade
association that looked like it might be fixing pricings or setting quotas on production. While Hoover
did not endorse cartels, he had a much broader view of the proper role of a trade association.
MCCRAW,supra note 54, at 148-49.
141 MCCRAW, supra note 54, at 151. For instance, Hoover's Commerce Department helped to
establish a quasi-public body called the Central Committee on Lumber Standards (CCLS) to assist the
lumber industry, which had been depleting the natural resources it needed to persist. The CCLS was
staffed by representatives of the lumber industry itself. For a time, it worked closely with the
140
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withstand the great crash that was soon to come. After 1929, the
too great. The
temptation to fix prices and divide the market proved
142
associationalist ideal receded but it did not disappear.
4. New Deal Regulation and the Professions
Franklin Delano Roosevelt had the difficult task of creating an
administrative tower from this babble. He inherited a problem that would
plague generations to come: the government increasingly depended on
experts within business but fundamentally distrusted their ability or
inclination to serve public ends. The New Deal was united in the fairly
uncontroversial position that there was something chronically wrong with
capitalism. 143 While New Deal liberals may have shared that general
conviction, there was no consensus on how to solve the problem. As
wrote, the program was "a chaos of
Richard Hofstadter
experimentation. '44 The early New Deal was in no way ideologically
bankrupt. To the contrary, it was a collection of a myriad of conflicting
Thus, the fragmented New Deal
and complementary theories. 145
responded to the immediate crisis with a combination of new and inherited
ideas about regulation. 146 The early New Deal was created from several
It echoed the system of national
distinctly American threads.
governmental planning developed during the First World War, while
147
preserving Hoover's associational view of government intervention.
The intense new distrust of business, however, led New Deal architects to
rely in a different way on the quasi-public bodies that developed under
Hoover. 148 Associationalism and corporatism could not fully survive the
great crash, but theories of regulation die a slow death.
Bits and pieces of Hoover's ideal survived and were written into New
Deal reforms. Amidst the Great Depression, government could no longer
rely solely on corporations to regulate themselves, but the theories of
regulation extant at the time and popular opinion simply precluded massive
Commerce Department. The CCLS was ultimately able to help the lumber industry preserve resources
for the future while lowering its costs. Hawley, supra note 109, at 103-07.
142McCRAW, supra note 54, at 149; Hawley, supra note 115, at 108.
43

1

See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL, 1932-1940,
JORDAN A. SCHWARTZ, THE NEW DEALERS: POWER POLMCS IN THE AGE OF

at 34 (1963);

ROOSEVELT (1993).
'4 HOFSTADTER, supra note 68, at 307.
145

46

See id.
The literature on the New Deal is obviously immense.

For a useful overview of the

historiography, see Thomas Ferguson, Industrial Conflict and the Coming of the New Deal: The
Triumph of MultinationalLiberalism in America, in THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER,
1930-1980, at 3, 5-7 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle eds., 1989); Alonzo L. Hamby, The New Deal:
Avenues for Reconsideration,31 POLITY 665 (1999).
47Rabin, supra note 62, at 1244.
148 id.
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government intervention into the economy. 14 9
The independent
professions served to reconcile the associationalist ideology of regulation
with the new thrust toward greater government control.
The first, and arguably the most significant, act of Roosevelt's
administration was the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of
1933.50 Using the trade groups that had grown up under Hoover's
associationalist state, the NIRA went quite a few steps further by granting
the President authority to approve standards of competition drafted by each
of these industry groups. 151 From the beginning government, labor, and
consumer representatives rarely participated, and the National Recovery
1 52
Administration ultimately expressed the interests of business groups.
The NIRA was declared unconstitutional, 1 53 and while it was certainly not
the only model for regulation during the New Deal, it starkly
demonstrates,
154
measures.
new
the
into
crept
regulation
of
forms
older
how
Roosevelt's program transcended its somewhat humble roots by
acknowledging that government had an obligation to repair the economy.
By 1933, most people agreed that the market was chronically sick and that
government would have to intervene in some permanent way to make it
better. Of course, no one could agree on how. 15 5 Labor felt sure that mass
organization and collective bargaining would help.
Businessmen
advocated price and production controls. Some felt that raising wages and
purchasing power would heal the ailing beast. Others were sure that
curbing competition and ensuring
profits would stimulate investment
56
spending and fix the market.1
Amidst this cacophony, Felix Frankfurter, a close friend of Louis
Brandeis, mentor to James Landis, and key architect of the New Deal,
summed up a new view of the government's proper role and in turn, the
part that experts would play in this new order. He wrote:
The expert should be on tap, but not on top ....
In a
democracy, politics is a process of popular education-the
task of adjusting the conflicting interests of diverse groups in
the community and bending the hostility and suspicion and
ignorance engendered by group interests toward a
49

See ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND WAR
4-7, 17 (1995); LEUCHTENBERG, supra note 143, at 33-37.
1

'0 National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
151LEUCHTENBERG, supra note 143, at 56-58.

152See Rabin, supra note 62, at 1244.
153Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-42, 551 (1935); Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935).
154See Rabin, supra note 62, at 1246.
155BRINKLEY, supra note 149, at 4-6; LEUCHTENBERG, supra note 143, at 22-35.
156Rabin, supra note 62, at 1246-47.
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comprehension of mutual understanding. For these ends,
expertise is indispensable. But politicians must enlist popular
support for the technical means by which alone social
policies can be realized.' 5 7
Part of the reason why the ideology of the New Deal seems so elusive
is that that ideology was to remain agnostic. While many of its architects
had very specific views of what went wrong and how to fix it, the New
Dealers did not commit to a political economy. They did not choose a
philosophy on social welfare. But they did have a philosophy of sorts.
Just as Hoover had used the government apparatus to enlist popular
support for a cooperative war effort, the New Deal government would
enlist popular support for goals defined in any given setting by the experts
themselves. Politicians would articulate a broad social goal but experts
would guide society to that end. Just as government experts persuaded
business to serve the needs of a state at war, experts-in the mind of the
New Deal architects-would train all conflicting interests to pursue a
common goal, defined in each different context by the experts themselves.
The dangers of democratic rule could be solved not by creating a
technocratic government' 5" but rather by using experts to train people to
act for the common good. It was the government's role to ensure that the
experts had sufficient authority and independence to work and that the
people had sufficient faith and patience to allow them to do so.159
This is not to say that the New Deal simply extended the
associationalism of the previous generation. 60 The early New Deal
programs enacted a radical and unprecedented government control over
trade practices. 16 1 Given the novelty of the New Deal, it is not surprising
that Roosevelt was constantly hedging-matching every radical social
welfare program with another designed to cater to business interests.
Science and expertise would neutralize the tendency of political power to
corrupt, solve the nation's economic woes, protect individuals, and serve to
check the power of the executive. As James Landis remarked,
If the doctrine of the separation of power implies division, it
also implies balance, and balance calls for equality. The
creation of administrative power may be the means for the
t5

SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 60 (quoting FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS

GOVERNMENT 161 (1930)).
18 "Technocracy" refers to a world in which experts run the economy rather than private industry.

In 1932, a group of engineers and scientists in America began to agitate for a technocracy. Inspired by
Veblen's The Engineers and the Price System and led by a charismatic professional engineer named
Howard Scott, the technocrats wanted to abolish private property and money in favor of a system in
which a group of experts would organize distribution and consumption. WILLIAM E. AKIN,
TECHNOCRACY AND THE AMERICAN DREAM: THE TECHNOCRAT MOVEMENT, 1900-1941 (1977).
159See LANDIS, supra note 23, at 60-62.
'60See LEUCHTENBERG, supra note 143, at 61.
161See, e.g., id. at 52-58.
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preservation of that balance, so that paradoxically enough,
though it may seem in theoretic violation of the doctrine of
the separation of power, it may in matter of fact be 62
the means
1
doctrine.
that
of
content
the
of
preservation
the
for
Ultimately, Landis argued, experts would do what, in the minds of
legal realists, the courts had failed so miserably to accomplish. 163 Not only
would expertise solve the intricate problems of modem industrial America,
it would police the boundaries of state power while ensuring the welfare of
all.' 64
During World War I and the 1920s, the experts were the industry
leaders themselves. 65 After the crash, the corporatist ideal simply could
not hold. Industry could not be trusted to navigate the disaster. It could
not be trusted to police itself, but, it seemed, the professions could.
Divorced from politics and business, the professions stood poised to take
control. Government turned to academics, engineers, doctors, social
scientists, and professional accountants to fill the void. Landis explained
that with the shift from a laissez-faire economy to a new form of
"collectivism," the professions would play the critical role in reformulating
the "postulates" upon which our society rests. 166 Landis listed workmen's
compensation legislation and the recognition of collective bargaining as
two signs that we had, indeed, abandoned the individualistic premises of an
earlier generation. 167 He argued that lawyers had claimed a "monopoly
over statecraft," by asserting that they were the only profession concerned
with social problems. Landis insisted that "it was sheer egotism on the part
of one profession to say that [it] and
[it] alone could articulate such
' 68
fundamental postulates of our society.,
In the course of recognizing the role of the professional in governance,
Landis acknowledged that the distinction between private and public
regulation was tenuous at best:
The framing of principles of business management and
operation, when done by private agencies, is ordinarily not
supra note 23, at 46.
supranotes 19-25 and accompanying text.

162 LANDIS,
163See

'- HORWITZ, supra note 19, at 213-46. Landis was not the first to articulate the idea that
expertise would serve to restrain state power. The notion emerged throughout the early part of the
century as progressive legal thought and legal realism discredited the role of the judiciary in defining
coherent set of norms to limit the power of the state. Id. at 224.
165See Rabin, supranote 62, at 1238.
166 James Landis, The New Responsibilities of the Professions in their Interrelationships with

Business Management, speech before the Bureau of Personnel Administration (Mar. 30, 1939)
(transcript available at the Library of Congress, James Landis Papers).
167Id.
168 id.
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reviewed by courts. But when a similar task is undertaken by
an administrative agency juridical intervention becomes
common. There is very little difference so far as these
matters go between administrative agencies representing the
government and an independent private agency such as, for
example, the Stock Exchange. The Board of the U.S. Steel
Corporation is a governing board just as much
as a board
69
appointed by the United States Government.1
Landis concluded that those private bodies should appoint
professionals to guide their judgments. He suggested that "failure to admit
such men has been responsible in part for the interference of government.
And government has interfered to exercise powers very little different from
those that business itself could have exercised.' 170 In other words, private
parties coordinating their own behavior is no different from government
regulation, and if businesses would consult professionals to guide the
process, there would be no need for bureaucrats. Thus, as Landis saw it,
the administrative state was not hierarchical. Regulation was diffuse,
falling upon private parties themselves just as much as government agents.
Ideally, professionals would make sure that expertise suffused both
business and government and develop "postulates" that served the public.
Landis recognized that "professionals tend to be narrow in approach" due
to their professional training but he felt confident that this would change,
that professionals would assume the new responsibilities thrust upon
them. 171
B. The History of the Accounting Profession
Against this backdrop, the American accounting profession scrambled
to catch up with the older professions. The profession struggled to gain
legitimacy throughout the period prior to the New Deal. Despite modest
gains in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, the accounting profession
failed to procure a role for itself in the incipient regulatory state. The
profession finally won recognition in World War I, but rather than pursue
that course, accountants allied with business during the Roaring Twenties.
Government policy toward business regulation, expertise, and the
accounting profession contributed to this course. While there were seeds
of a public ethic in the profession's past, it was largely absent in the period
immediately preceding the New Deal.' 72 It was in this unfortunate context
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.

172PREVITS

& DUBIS MERINO, supra note 13, at 236. Historians tend to view the Securities Acts

as an unprecedented recognition of the accounting profession by government. See, e.g., id at 274.
This is, of course, true in that no prior law had required companies to obtain an independent audit from
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that the Securities Act of 1933 formalized the role of the profession as an
intermediary between business and government.
This section will review the development of the profession in America
during the same periods discussed in the section on the history of
regulation to understand how the
profession grew up in relation to both the
73
federal and state governments.'
1. Accountants in the 19th Century
The history of the accounting profession goes back to the 15th century
in Europe, when bookkeepers began to use the double-entry system of
debits and credits. 74 In 1494, Luca Pacioli wrote the first real treatise on
accounting. 175
However sophisticated their methods, these early
bookkeepers 76 either worked part-time or were employed by a
corporation.
Public accountants, however, did not emerge in Britain until the mid19th century.177 As financial relations grew more complex, accounting,
not surprisingly, became more sophisticated. 178 In the middle of the 19th
century, Britain enacted a series of statutes, known as the Companies Acts,
to regulate the expanding and mutating corporate forms. 17 9 In particular,
the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 and the Companies Clauses Act of
1845 required all registered companies to obtain an audit from an
independent accountant. 180 Many British accountants traveled to the States
181
to monitor the growingly extensive investments, and some stayed on.
The system of railways in the United States, commonly known as the
"octopus,"' 182 created a need for internal auditing, and many railroads
a public accountant. But in another-and I will argue-significant way, the government had grown to
rely on accountants throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
173The period before 1887 is obviously important to the development of the profession in the
United States as is its roots in British accountancy. Sean O'Connor has developed an interesting thesis
on the development of independence in the profession by tracing the development of the American
profession in relation to Britain. Sean O'Connor, Careful What You Wish For: How Accountants and
Congress Created the Problem ofAuditor Independence, 45 B.C. L. REV. 741, 773-77 (2004).
'74PREVITS

& DUBIS MERINO, supra note 13, at 2-3.
See also JOHN L. CAREY, THE RISE OF THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION: FROM

175Id. at 3-4.

TECHNICIAN TO PROFESSIONAL, 1896-1936, at 14 (1969). Double-entry bookkeeping is a system in
which each transaction is recorded as both a debit and a credit. In other words, credit entries represent
the source of financing while debit entries denote the use of that financing.
176 During the colonial era, British accountants visited America to monitor the extensive trade between
Britain and its colonies. CAREY, supra note 175, at 21.
177O'Connor,

supra note 173, at 745.
171
Id.at 746-47.
79
1 Id.at 749.

' Id. at 749-50.
181
CAREY, supra note 175, at 22.

182 The term was coined by Frank Norris in a novel by that name to refer to the railroad
with its
tentacles reaching out in all directions. Frank Norris, The Octopus, in NOVELS AND ESSAYS (Viking
Press 1986) (1901).
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83

included audit reports in their statements to shareholders.
At the same
time, the federal government was employing more accountants to master
the growing complexity of the federal budget.' 84 The accounting
profession nonetheless remained fairly disorganized and underdeveloped in
the United States.
The United States trailed behind England in its transition to a corporate
economy and neither state nor federal law required audits until the New
Deal. The first accounting association, the American Association of Public
Accountants (AAPA), did not emerge until 1887 and it did not enjoy the
public recognition of its counterpart in England. 185 Nor did it achieve the
general recognition that other professions were beginning to secure in
America. During the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, the accounting
profession failed to secure any significant8 6role for itself in the emerging
structure of national economic regulation.
The national organization limped to the end of the century. Public
accountants were plagued with problems in their effort to acquire status as
a profession. The national organization competed with state associations
of Certified Public Accountants (CPA) for recognition. The first CPA law
was passed in 1896 in New York. 187 Unlike law or medicine, the
legislation did not restrict practice to license holders, but rather limited the
use of the title "certified public accountant. ' 188 The New York law
provided the model for other states. 189 As the state associations grew, they
also grew suspicious of the AAPA with its ties to Great Britain and its
elitist mien. 190 In 1902, the state societies formed a group called the
Federation of Societies of Public Accountants.' 9' A few years later the two
92
organizations merged, temporarily quieting the competitive din. 1
Meanwhile, financial reports were rare and those that existed were
largely for the benefit of bankers rather than stockholders. 193 American
corporations operated under a veil of secrecy that was considered both
necessary and appropriate. It was not until the late 19th century that the
public
gradually started
clamoring for more accountability.
Unsurprisingly, it did so in the context of the railroads because the great
183PREVITS & DUBiS MERINO, supra note 13, at 85.

'MId. at 95-96.
185Id. at 138-39; O'Connor, supra note 173, at 752.
186 CAREY, supra note 175, at 45-47.
'Id. at 44.
ld. at 43-45.
89
' Id. at 45.
'90Id. at 50.
191PREVITS & DUBIS MERINO, supra note 13, at 191.
192CAREY, supranote 175, at 51-52.
193PREVITS & DuBis MERINO, supra note 13, at 116.
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railways acquired funding primarily94 through individual investments much
earlier than other sorts of industry.'
The railroads were among the first clients of the early accounting firms
in the United States.' 95 Far from a voluntary effort to inform the investing
public of the financial health of the railroads, mostly this was due first to
state and then to federal regulatory efforts. Charles Francis Adams, Jr., a
member of the Massachusetts Railroad Commission, catalogued the abuses
inherent in the speculative financing of railroads in the 1860s and he was
among the first to insist upon publicity in accounts. 19 6 As more and more
state commissions required periodic reports, railroads began to employ
certify the correctness of their financial statements to
public accountants to
97
stockholders.'
their
2.

The ProgressiveEra Campaignfor Recognition

After the federal government stepped in, the local state regulations
gave way to national control. The ICC's first chairman, Thomas M.
Cooley, recruited the economist Henry Carter Adams to serve as its chief
statistician. Sharing Charles Francis Adams's skepticism about the ability
of courts to resolve the nation's industrial problems, the two expressed a
faith, which would later gain widespread acceptance, that only experts
could bring order and justice to the market. 198 To fulfill the agency's
legislative mandate, Cooley and Adams set about devising a system of
accounts. 199 They did so by consulting the experts. The ICC relied heavily
Officers
on advice from the Association of American Railway Accountant
20 0
accountants.
railroad
of
organization
private
(AARAO), a
At the early stages, the ICC was largely involved in an effort to gather
information about railroads. 20 1 During this period, Adams did not consult
the AAPA.2 °2 He did not enlist their service, but rather turned to
194See generallyJOHN MOODY, HOW TO ANALYZE RAILROAD REPORTS (1912) (outlining railroad

report analysis for an emerging investor class).
195See JAMES T. ANYON, RECOLLECTIONS OF THE EARLY DAYS OF AMERICAN ACCOUNTANCY,

1883-1893, at 20 (1925).
196 Charles Francis Adams, Jr., The Erie Railroad Row, 3 AM. L. REV. 41 (1869).
McCRAw, supra note 54, at 17-25.

See also

197See generally ANYON, supra note 195 (describing the role of the late 19th century accounting
professional in America).
'98Miranti, supra note 64, at 475-76.
'99 Id. at 476-78.

200Id. at 478-79. The railroad accountants, for instance, convinced the ICC that it was impossible
to base regulation on a cost-of-service estimate-assessing the joint costs for railways in providing
their service. Id. at 479. At the AARAO's urging, he switched to a value-of-service system instead,
which evaluated worth through estimates of the amounts that particular classes of consumers were
willing to pay. Id.
2o0Id. at 470.
202 Id. at 476.
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accountants within the businesses themselves to provide the information
and the expertise necessary to render the data useful to the general needs of
investors. 203 As the ICC gradually grew more aggressive in assessing the
reasonableness of rates, 204 it relied even more heavily on railroad
accountants to help standardize the accounting systems. 20 5 Meanwhile, the
agency began to develop its own expertise, hiring a small crew of
accountants, which expanded after the Hepburn Act of 1906 gave
the ICC
20 6
authority to set rates and prescribe uniform rules of accounting.
The accounting profession seized the opportunity and attempted to
secure a role for itself as the government expanded control over the
railroad corporations. Prior to enactment of the Hepburn Act, A. Lowes
Dickinson, the Secretary of the Committee on Legislation of the AAPA,
wrote a letter to Senator Stephen B. Elkins regarding the proposed
amendments to the Act to Regulate Commerce of 1887.207 The bill
included a provision for the examination of statements required by the Act
to Regulate Commerce.2 °8
Dickinson argued that "examinations of
accounts by politically appointed bodies are inefficient." 209
Public
accountants, on the other hand, had developed an expertise in the private
sector and could use that experience to conduct audits on behalf of the
Commission. 2 1° He urged that "both the federal and state governments
should recognize [public accountants] to the same extent that they have
already been recognized by the commercial community and by the
governments of other countries, particularly Great Britain. ' 211 At the same
time, accountants were arguing for independent audits of all railroad
reports. 212 An editorial published in the first volume of the Journal of
Accountancy-the professional publication of the AAPA-recognized the
potential for abuse when management begins to take control of a
corporation without direct supervision by shareholders.213 The editorial
argued that public accountants-who are uniquely concerned about their
203Id. at 480. The AARAO assisted the iCC in devising uniform formats for balance sheets so
that investors could determine liquidity, solvency, and profitability.
204 Miranti, supra note 64, at 480-85.
205Id. at 481.
20
6 HOOGENBOOM & HOOGENBOOM, supra note 45, at 52-53.
207 Letter from A. Lowes Dickinson to Stephen B. Elkins (Jan. 31, 1906), reprintedin the minutes
of the Annual Meeting of the American Association of Public Accountants, I J. ACCT. 424, 433-34
(1906).
20
Id. at 433.
209ld. at 433-34.
"0 Id. at 433.
211

id

212 Editorial,
213 F.A.

395 (1906).

The Public Accountant and Publicity, I J. ACCT. 136, 136-37 (1905).
Cleveland, Advantages of an Independent Railway Audit to the Investor, I J. ACCT. 386,
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2 14
reputation as professionals-are necessary to ensure against scandals.
But the profession was too young and the government unreceptive. The
proposed amendments never found their way to the Senate floor and
government mandated audits by independent public accountants remained
a long way off.
The Act to Regulate Commerce provided for annual, monthly and
special reports from railroad carriers and gave the ICC authority to
prescribe uniform systems of accounts and inspect any accounts, records,
or memoranda kept by the carriers. 2 15 The AAPA pleaded with the ICC to
consult public accountants to design the forms of railroad reports. 216 In a
letter to the agency, the AAPA claimed that, unlike the body of public
accountants, the chief statistician of the ICC-Henry Carter Adams-was
not an expert on recording transactions. 2 17 The tone of the letter was polite
but firm. It is hard not to sense a certain bitterness in the letter, as the
AAPA deferred to the expertise of "Professor Adams" in statistics, but
stressed that he had no experience with accounts:

While this association recognizes that Professor Adams' long
experience in connection with railroad accounts and statistics
has constituted him an authority on this subject ... his
knowledge has relation more to the statistics and the results
to be obtained from books than218
to the devising of systems for
recording original transactions.
The agency responded politely, acknowledging its willingness to meet with
the AAPA, but perhaps slightly condescendingly emphasized that it had
already consulted its private counterpart, the American Association of
Railroad Accountants (AARO).219
While public accountants did not receive the recognition they were
looking for, the push and pull between the agency and the railroads and the
agency and the courts initially forced the government to rely on accounting
experts. Rather than turn to public accountants, the government relied on
the accountants within the regulated industry. In a circular dated May 10,
1907, the ICC announced the form of the new railroad accounts, noting
214

Id.

This would presage the thesis of Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means in The Modem

Corporation and Private Property, published in 1933, which addressed the dangers of an entrenched
management free from shareholder oversight.
215 Act to Regulate Commerce of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379.
216 Letter to Hon. Martin A. Knapp, Chairman of the ICC, (Aug. 20, 1906), reprinted in the
minutes of the Annual Meeting of the American Association of Public Accountants, 3 J. ACcT. 58, 75-

76(1906).
2 17
Id. at 76.
218

id.

219 Id.

at 77. For a discussion of the rejection of the AAPA's suggestion that only qualified

accountants be permitted to audit railroads, see AAPA YEARBOOK (1906).
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that its aim was to cooperate with the carriers to perfect methods of
accounting. 22 During the rate hearings, however, government regulators
and railroad accountants assumed an adversarial relationship as railroads
tried to defend their high rates to an incredulous audience. 221 Over the next
several years, as the federal agency grew more sophisticated and Congress
increased its breadth, the ICC began to integrate more accountants into the
bureaucracy but it had difficulty finding individuals with knowledge of
and railroad operations who were willing to enter the
both accounting
222
public sector.
The need for uniform accounting standards would plague accountants
for years to come, because without them critics would unsurprisingly
accuse the profession of playing with different standards to achieve a
desired result. Nonetheless, it was the government not the profession that
provided the first systems of uniform accounting.223 The Act to Regulate
Commerce gave the ICC authority to prescribe uniform accounting
methods.224 While its initial attempts to standardize accounting procedure
were controversial at best, throughout this period, it was the federal and
state governments, not the profession, that pioneered the effort to
standardize accounts.22 5
As government and industry worked out its complex relationship, the
public accountants stayed on the sidelines. 226 While many audited the
statements of railroads, they did not play a central role in devising policy
and standards. In 1907, the ICC's chief statistician Henry Carter Adams
spoke before the AAPA.22 7 Perhaps in response to the slight he received a
year earlier, he betrayed his own belief that public accountants had no
special role in devising policy when he stated that issues of government
control and political science228"lie outside the sphere of discussion by an
association of accountants."
Similarly, as government tried to make sense of the massive mergers
and combinations of the 1890's, it largely ignored public accountants. In
1898, Congress convened the Industrial Commission to hold hearings on
combinations in restraint of trade.22 9 Public accountants were not invited
220Editorial, New Interstate Commerce Commission Circular, 4 J. ACCT. 150, 150 (1907).
22'

Miranti, supra note 64, at 481.

22Id.at 482.
223

Arthur W. Teele, Railroad Accounting in Relation to the 20th Section of the Act to Regulate

Commerce, 7 J. ACCT. 89 (1908).
224 Id.
225 Id. See also Roy Smith, State Supervision Over Accounting Methods, Part IV- Supervision
Over the Accounting of Public Service Corporations, 8 J. ACCT. 419, 419-20 (1909).
226
See Teele, supra note 223, at 89.
227 Henry C. Adams, Railway Accounting in its Relation to the Twentieth Section of the Act to
Regulate Commerce, 6 J. ACCT. 381, 382 (1908).
228Id.at 382.
229 PREVITS & DUBIS MERINO, supra note 13, at 184.
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to join.230 The Commission issued a report urging the government to
prevent the great combinations from deceiving the investing public. 231 232
The AAPA was a national organization in name primarily.
Accountants were still scattered throughout their various state
organizations and despite the merger, the AAPA remained small and
disorganized.2 33 It was nonetheless busy trying to claim professional status
for its members. It did so, in part, by arguing that accountancy was a
science.2 34 As one speaker at the annual AAPA meeting in 1905 stated,
"[a]ccounting is properly defined by Locke as 'a science of reason and
common sense,' which comprehends all and is the keystone of professional
existence. ' 235 An article in the first volume of the Journal of Accountancy
emphasized that "accountancy to-day is peculiarly one of the most
,,236 Throughout the
complex, definite and positive of the sciences.
early years of the 20th century, accountants attempted to gain public
recognition as a profession by invoking the scientific nature of their expert
body of knowledge. 237 One prominent accountant even championed the
profession by referring238to H.G. Wells's prophecy that the future of the race
lay with the scientists.
The profession also sought legitimacy by declaring the centrality of
accountants to national progress.239 In the early years of the 20th century,
accountants argued that they were essential to progress because the
mastery of accounts was the only way to train business toward a "common
purpose. '240 From this early period, the profession was attempting to carve
a role for itself between business and government. The accounting
profession would simultaneously guard against the self-interest of
capitalism and the horrors of government control.24 ' Countering the antimonopoly movement, one lawyer argued that accountants and lawyers
23 0

Id.

2311d.at

185.
d.at 138-39.
233 Id. at 138. At the turn of the century, the AAPA had fewer than 100 members, most of whom
were English-born residents of New York City. Id.
234 E.g., Salutation of Frank Broaker, reprinted in the minutes of the Annual Meeting of the
American Association of Public Accountants, I J. ACCT.76, 86 (1905).
235 Id.
236 Cleveland F. Bacon, The Accountant as an Expert Witness, I J. ACcT. 99, 100 (1905).
237 See Frank Broaker, Accounting An Exact Science, I J. AccT. 328, 329 (1906); Editorial,
2321

Accountancy and Economics, 7 J. ACCT. 237, 237-38 (1909); David Kinley, The Field ofAccountancy,
2 J. ACCT. 187, 190-92 (1906); James Logan, The Importance of Scientific Accounting, 6 J. ACCT. 276,
276-77 (1908); Seymour Walton, The Relation of the Commercial Lawyer to the Certified Public
Accountant, 7 J. AccT. 205, 205 (1909); Technique in Accounting, 2 J. ACCT. 54, 54 (1906).
238 William Arthur Chase, Our Critics, 8 J. ACCT. 432, 438 (1909).
239 F.A. Cleveland, The Scope of the ProfessionofAccountancy, 1 J. ACCT. 40, 55 (1905).
240Id.
241

id.
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together would usher in progress, preventing a return to "the small and
limited transactions of our forefathers. 24 2
Accountants were not alone in viewing the expert as the means to
social progress. Quoting Charles William Eliot, the President of Harvard
University, one accountant claimed in 1909 that "[i]t is plain that the future
prosperity and progress of American communities are hereafter going to
depend much more than ever before on the large groups of higher trained
men which constitute what are called the professions. ' 243 He concluded
that the professions would supplant government as the leading force in
modem America: "Political agencies are becoming secondary and
subordinate influences. The real incentives and motive powers which
impel society forward spring from those bodies of well-trained, alert and
progressive men known as the professions.' 244 Henry Clews, a prominent
American financier, used civic republican rhetoric to argue that the country
needed experts to ensure that corporations were trained to the public
purpose.245 He argued that corporations were invested with both public
and private interest, but that managers were selfish.246 Through corruption
and moral decay, they inevitably lost sight of the common good.247
Experts, however, trained to examine accounts could ensure that
corporations served the
public good, rather than the interest of the greedy
248
and amoral managers.
While other professions drew legitimacy by contrasting their expertise
with the pretense of quacks and shysters, the accounting profession did so,
in part, by discrediting the government's ability to do accounting work on
its own. 24 9 The competition for public accounting, unlike law and
medicine, came from the government itself. During Theodore Roosevelt's
administration, accountants were already voicing concern that the
government might generalize from its experience monitoring railroads and
conduct audits of all corporations by itself.250 The profession warned that
corruption and inefficiency would ensue. 25 1 Public accountants insisted
that it was their role, not that of bureaucrats, to audit the records of
242Albert N. Eastman, The Relation of the Public Accountant to the Lawyer, 5 J. ACCT. 183, 184

(1907). See also John Alexander Cooper, ProfessionalEthics, 5 J. ACCT. 81,94 (1907).
243Chase, supra note 158, at 438.
2

44Id. at 438-39.
HENRY CLEWS, THE WALL STREET POINT OF VIEW 26, 29-30 (1900).
246 Id. at 26.
24 7
Id. at 26-27.
248Id. at 26-30.
249 Sociologists have argued that professions develop by establishing a jurisdiction, from which
245

they exclude everyone who lacks their special training or expertise. ANDREW D. ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM
OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF EXPERT LABOR (1988). Michel Foucault has argued

that the professions, or the disciplines, created new spheres of authority through the control of
knowledge. See Jan E. Goldstein, FoucaultAmong the Sociologists: The "'Disciplines"and the History
of the Professions,23 HIST. & THEORY 170, 175 (1984).
20 Editorial, Uniformity in Railway Accounting, 3 J. ACCT. 36, 37 (1906).
251 Id.
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corporations. 2 52

They argued that regulation was inadequate because it did
not require corporations to file reports audited by a qualified public
accountant. 253 The profession repeatedly used the failures of the ICC 254
as
proof that the government was unqualified to audit accounts.
Accountants warned that a body of government inspectors was doomed to
failure, a sure road to all the evils of socialism. 255 The inefficiency would
ensure graft and corruption rather than morality in the marketplace. 256 By
defining itself in contrast to the state, the accounting profession was
already beginning to ally itself, at least rhetorically, with the efficiency
of
257
business against the corruption and wastefulness of government.
Accountants not only claimed a special role due to the neutrality of
their science and expertise, they also distinguished themselves from
corrupt politicians.258 During the Progressive Era, when public corruption
received so much attention from reformers, accountants championed their
independence from political influence. 259 As a 1913 editorial in the
JournalofAccountancy put it, accountants doing public or corporate work
"shall be qualified by ability and not by personal favor merely. ' 2 60
Independence, at the time, meant independence from political corruption
just as much as, if not more than, freedom from the corrupting influence of
the market.
252See, e.g.,

Editorial, New York's Panic, 5 J.OF ACCT. 58, 59-60 (1907).

253J.E. Sterrett, Legislationfor the Controlof Corporations,9 J. AccT. 241, 242-46 (1910). See

also Roy Smith, State Administrative Supervision Over Local Accounting, 9 J. ACCT. 263, 263-67
(1910) (contrasting different state regulatory schemes, specifically in Indiana in 1909, and Idaho in
1905).
254 Editorial, The New FederalIncorporation Bill, 9 J. ACcT. 279, 283 (1910). This editorial
discusses a proposed bill for exclusive federal incorporation, which was never passed. Both Roosevelt
and Taft advocated a system for federally chartered corporations. Neither one pursued the matter with
enough enthusiasm to support federal legislation, thus the successive bills introduced in 1910, 1911 and
1912 all withered. Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Note, Corporate Privilegesfor the Public Benefit: The
Progressive Federal IncorporationMovement and the Modern Regulatory State, 77 VA. L. REv 603,
624 (1991). See also Melvin 1. Urofsky, Proposed Federal Incorporation Legislation in the
ProgressiveEra, 26 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 160, 165 (1982) (illustrating the arguments for federal, rather
than state, regulation over corporations). The editorial comments, in relevant part:
While there is no evidence in the text of the proposed law that it is the intention to
create in the Bureau of Corporations a body of examining clerks who will
themselves take up the audit of the accounts, rumors to that effect have become
current, the tendency of the federal government to take up this class of work, for
which it is in no way qualified and which can only be carried out at a great expense
to the community, is shown by the extension in this direction of the activities of the
Interstate Commerce Commission.
Editorial, supra note, at 283.
255 John Alex Cooper, FederalRelations: Advancement and Regulations of the Profession, 15 J.
ACCT. 1, 9 (1913).
256 Robert H. Montgomery, Federal Controlof Corporations,14 J. OF ACCT. 272,283 (1912).
257 Editorial, The Recognition of the Efficient, 15 J. AccT. 259, 260 (1913).
s8Id.at 261.
2 59

Id.

260

Id.at 259.
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The Taft administration did turn to public accountants in a limited way
to help reform the federal bureaucracy.' 61 In 1911, the President set up a
Commission on Economy and Efficiency to introduce business methods to
government, and appointed several leading accountants to the board.26 2
Harvey S. Chase, a prominent member of the AAPA and municipal
accounting expert, served on the Commission and drafted several reports
on auditing problems. 263 Despite repeated pleas to be included in
government regulatory bodies, however, public accountants did not
become a permanent force in devising policy or reform. 264 In 1914, Robert
H. Montgomery, the president of the AAPA, lamented that government
265
commissions and departments were not staffed by public accountants.
The government ultimately chose to do without the service of the expert
public accountants. This fact did not go unnoticed. In a speech before the
annual convention of public accountants, one government lawyer noted
that much of the government accounting work is done by economists or
political scientists rather than accountants. 266 In comparing public to
private accounting, he reasoned that public accounting serves a critical role
in protecting individual welfare. 267 Rather than simply measuring profit
and loss, accounting in government secures life and property. 268

"The

problem of governmental accounting," he reasoned, "is especially difficult
because of the far-reaching purposes and effects of governmental
transactions." 269 He explained that governmental transactions involve the
"protection of life and property," which "cannot be expressed in terms of
profit and loss ... ,270 Thus, the professions began to develop a rhetoric
in which expertise, not the courts, is critical to secure fundamental liberties
by protecting the welfare of all.
PREvITs & DUBIS MERINO, supra note 13, at 178.
Id.
263 Id. at 178-79; Harvey S. Chase, The NationalBudget on its ExpenditureSide, 15 J. ACCT. 397,
261

262

397 (1913).
264 Edward L. Suffem, The Contribution of the Accountant in Support of the Commission on
IndustrialRelations, 13 J. ACcT. 401, 402-03 (1912). Suffern noted that in Great Britain, unlike in the
United States, government not only consulted accountants, but also appointed them to prominent
positions. In England, for instance, Sir William Plender, a public accountant, headed the Commission
to Investigate Parliamentary Affairs. Id. See also Wilhelm Jensen, Workmen 's Compensation Act of
Washington, 14 J. ACCT. 380, 380 (1912) (lamenting fact that Workmen's Compensation Act was

enacted without consulting public accountants).
265 Robert H. Montgomery, Report of the President, 18 J. AcCT. 241, 241-42 (1914). See also
Elijah W. Sells, The Accounting Profession:Its Demands andIts Future,20 J. ACCT. 325, 329 (1915)
(calling for a new field for public accountants in public office).
266 George E. Frazer, Who Can Qualify for Governmental Accounting, 14 J. ACCT. 259, 263
(1912).267Frazer spoke in his capacity as a member of the Wisconsin State Board of Public Affairs.
Id. at 264.
268 Id.

269

Id. at 264-65.

"0 Id. at 264.
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In the last years before World War I, the government took the first step
toward regulating the accounting profession.27' On November 10, 1914,
the Federal Reserve Board issued Circular Number 13 regarding
The Federal Reserve used
rediscounting of commercial paper.27 2
commercial paper as a basis for issuing currency, and the acceptability of
the paper depended on the strength of the original maker.2 73 To ensure the
security of a loan, the Federal Reserve required a signed statement, a
description of the business, a balance sheet, and a profit and loss
provided an exact method for characterizing the
statement.274 The circular
275
assets and liabilities.
The following year, Edwin N. Hurley, the vice chairman of the FTC,
began to preach the value of uniform systems of accounts.276 As part of his
plan, Hurley proposed "zone experts," government accountants who would
be dispatched 277
to particular geographic zones to help businesses prepare
their accounts.
The proposed FTC system of zone experts was a substitute for direct
control of the industry: Hurley assured businessmen that his agency would
not use "compulsory methods" but rather make experts available to
business. 278 The AAPA disapproved of the proposal. An editorial in the
Journal of Accountancy mocked the notion of government experts,
invoking the specter of communism:
Accountants will wonder whether they are to be an expert of
"zone one" or "zone ten." Possibly the most fortunate will be
rated as experts of all zones from the torrid to the frigid. ....
Looking down that long vista we can see struggling rows of
manufacturers, merchants and business men clamoring for
the advice and assistance of those fortunates [sic] upon whom
the federal trade commission shall have bestowed the titulary
encomium of "Z.E. 2 79
The FTC and the accounting profession agreed that accountants could
help regulate business without resorting to direct government control.
They simply disagreed on where the accountants should come from: not
surprisingly, the government proposed government accountants and the
27'

Editorial, Educating the Public, 19 J. ACCT. 359, 359-60 (1915).

Id.
Id. at 359.
274 Id.
272
273

Id. at 359-60.
In These UtopianDays, 20 J. ACCT. 129, 129-30 (1915).
277 id.
27
1Id. at 130-31.
2 79
27

276Editorial,

Id.

at 133.
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AAPA championed the public accountant. 280 The zone experts never
materialized but, in 1917, the Federal Reserve Board worked with the FTC
and the AAPA's successor association, the American Institute of Accounts
(AIA), to issue a pamphlet,
Uniform Accounting, the first comprehensive
28 1
set of accounting rules.

Despite this modest success, the accounting profession focused less on
securing a role for itself in government regulation as income tax laws
created a new market for its services in the private sector.282 While in 1895
the Supreme Court essentially declared the income tax unconstitutional,283
the Sixteenth Amendment provided a new basis for such laws. 2 8 In 1909,
Congress passed a corporate excise tax that generated both a great deal of
business for accountants and significant controversy. 285 The income28 tax
6
law of 1913 created a virtually endless supply of work for accountants.
As accountants were trying to find a role for themselves in business
and government, they continued to profess a devotion to high ideals, to
public service, and to independence from business. 28 7 This fact in and of
itself is rather unremarkable. All professions embrace a service ideal.288
As early as 1906, one editorial in the Journal of Accountancy suggested
280
211

Id.
PREVITS & DUBIS MERINO, supra note 13, at 230-32. In 1916, the AAPA reorganized, in part,

due to pressure from a segment within the institution to lobby for federal licensing of accountants. Id.
at 242. The resulting institution was renamed the American Institute of Accountants, but the suspicion
of many certified public accountants that the AIA secretly wanted to undermine state control over the
profession
continued. Id.
282
Id. at 182.
283 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1894).
The decision held that the
income tax was a direct tax that failed to conform to the rule of apportionment among the states. Id. at
587-88, 592. Because state by state apportionment of a tax on individual income was impracticable,
the decision essentially precluded income tax laws.
284 See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. The Sixteenth Amendment, adopted in 1913, provided, "[t]he
Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without
apportionment among the several states, and without regard to any census or enumeration." Id.
285 See PREViTS & DUBIS MERINO, supra note 13, at 181 (describing the 1909 corporate excise
tax
as a "highly profitable nightmare"); J.E. Sterrett, An Open Letter on the Corporation Tax Bill, 8 J.
ACCT 456, 456-58 (1909). The government did not confer with public accountants before passing the
act. Id. at 456. The law mandated that business revenue must be based on a cash rather than accrual
basis. See id. at 457. Most accountants and businessmen considered the cash basis an imprecise
measure of net income. See id. The cash basis for accounting dictates that a business should record
income only when it receives cash or a check from its customer, and it should record an expense only
when it actually pays a vendor. ANTHONY PHILLIPS ET AL., BASIC ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 54 (4th
ed. 1988). The accrual method requires that the business record income when the sale occurs,
regardless of whether the payment has been made, and an expense when it receives a good or a service,
even if it intends to pay at some later date. Id. at 53, 54.
286 See PREVITS & DUBIS MERINO, supra note 13, at 182.
287 See, e.g., W.A. Chase, The Profession of a Certified Public Accountant, 2 J. AcCT. 194, 200
(1906); Editorial, Burden of Prosperity, 18 J. ACCT. 296, 297-98 (1914); Editorial, Ethics of
Accountancy, 9 J. ACCT. 284, 284 (1910); J. Porter Joplin, The Ethics ofAccountancy, 17 J. ACCT. 187,
189, 190 (1914); Robert H. Montgomery, Professional Standards: A Plea for Cooperation Among
Accountants, I J. ACCT 28, 31 (1905); J.E. Sterrett, Professional Ethics, 4 J. ACCT. 407, 415-19
(1907); Proceedings,Annual Meeting of the American Association of Public Accountants, Twentieth
Annual Meetings, 5 J. ACCT. 137, 138 (1907).
288Goldstein, supra note 249, at 174-75.

2006]

THE MOST DANGEROUS PROFESSION

that public accountants should be hired by shareholders rather than
management to ensure independence. 289 Like lawyers, accountants used
the language of civic
republicanism and even religious mission to assert
290
their higher ideals.
During the Progressive Era, accountants proclaimed the centrality of
their profession to the future of the nation. 29' The efficiency movement,
government reform, and increased regulation created a market for
accountants' services, but the accounting profession was still in its
infancy.29 2 Unable to capitalize on the growing need for a uniform system
of accounts and government service, public accountants largely squabbled
amongst3 themselves as lawyers and economists in public offices took the
29
helm.
3. A New Role in World War l and the 1920s
During World War I, things changed. As business, labor, and
government began to work together, accountants played a significant role
in coordinating the effort.294 During the war, the government entered into
countless contracts with business for the purchase of munitions and
supplies. 295 Government lawyers devised a cost plus profit measure for
setting contract prices, which required public accountants to do the
calculations. 296 For instance, Herbert G. Stockwell, a certified public
accountant and member of the AIA (again, the successor organization to
299 Editorial, Collateral Employment of Accountants, 1 J. ACCT. 504, 505 (1906) ("Where the
accountant is depending for his employment upon the favor of the managers whose work he is to
scrutinize, he needs a robust moral sense to hew to the line without regard to the disposition of the
chips."). Accountants repeated this suggestion that the American system should provide for
shareholder election of accountants at least once. See Editorial, Integrity ofInvestment, 17 J. ACCT. 37,
40 (1914). This system would mirror that required by the British Companies Act. See O'Connor,
supra note 173, at 743-44.
290 E.g., Eli Moorhouse, The Mission of the Certified Accountant, 13 J. ACCT. 266, 266, 269
(1912). Moorhouse argued that false or misleading statements not only destroyed the reputation of the
accountant, but also his "own personal freedom of mind and conscience, if not actual freedom of
body." Id. at 268. He continued that "[tihe certified accountant must thus endeavor to show that he is
not merely a statistician nor even an interpreter of figures, but in the highest sense of the words a
business physician and evangelist."
Id. at 269.
While accountants invoked the notion of
"independence," a term associated with the civic republican tradition, they did so with far less
frequency and far less oratory flourish than lawyers. See Robert W. Gordon, The Ideal andthe Actual
in the Law, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 51-67 (Gerard W.
Gawalt ed., 1984) (discussing how lawyers, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, sought idealized
reform of their profession, yet despite their rhetoric, the profession continued to be subjected to
scandals and corruption).
291 See PREVITS & DUBIS MERINO, supra note 13, at
177.
'92
See id.
at 177-78.
293CAREY, supra note 175, at 126-28.
29 PREvrrS & DUalS MERINO, supra note 13, at 237. See also Editorial, Accountants' Services in
Wartime, 23 J. ACCT. 364, 364-65 (1917).
295 Editorial, Government Contracts, 23 J. ACCT. 450,450 (1917).
296 Id at 450, 450-52. See also Editorial, How Best to Serve, 26 J. ACCT. 38, 39 (1918).
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the AAPA), organized the food administration in each297state to determine
fair margins of profits for businesses that handle foods.
The AIA met with the Naval Consulting Board and the Council of
National Defense to determine how best to serve the war effort.2 98
Members served on the General Munitions Board, coordinating the
acquisition and purchase of emergency supplies. 299 Despite their growing
importance, one accountant, C.C. Waters, lamented that his profession was
not playing an even greater role in preparing the nation for war.3 °0
Comparing the accountant with the corporate lawyer, Waters suggested
that this might be the fault of the accountants themselves, who were
obsessed with profit rather than "public service. 30 1 He insisted, however,
that this focus was misguided, oddly dissonant with the real purpose of
accounting: "[s]ound accounting principles are like the principles of
international law. They are designed to protect the rights of the weaker
against infringement by the stronger. 30 2 Thus, Waters set a place for the
profession alongside the courts by claiming that it is uniquely suited to
protect the interests of the minority against the majority.
Further, Congress passed various tax laws during the war to meet the
unprecedented need for revenue.30 3 Unlike previous years, the government
consulted accountants to aid with the war effort.3 4 In fact and perhaps as a
result of the profession's newfound prominence, the commissioner of
Osborn, invited accountant Homer S. Pace to
Internal Revenue, William H.
30 5
Bureau.
the
reorganize
help
The war ushered in a new era. The accounting profession had gained
prominence and national recognition through its contribution to the war
effort.30 6 As a new decade brought peace and prosperity, accountants
championed their new prominence. 30 7 But they retreated from public
service. After the war, when the FTC proposed a plan for the registration
of accountants, the AIA emphatically opposed the proposal, arguing that
having the government identify those who qualified as an expert would
inevitably devolve into inefficiency and corruption since "[e]very
congressman from the backwoods and the plains would have a constantly
297 Herbert G. Stockwell, Accountants and the Food Administration, 26 J. ACCT. 250, 250-52

(1918).
Editorial, Accountants and the War, 24 J. AccT. 112, 112 (1917).
'991d.at 112-13.
300
See C.C. Waters, Public Accountants and Industrial Preparedness,23 J. ACCT. 445, 445-46
(1917).
301 Id. at 447, 448.
302
Id. at 448.
303 See PREVITS & DuBIs MERINO, supra note 13, at 255; Editorial, Genuine Service, 27 J. ACCT.
270, 270 (1919).
304See PREVITS & DuBis MERINO, supra note 13, at 237; Editorial, supra note 303, at 270-71.
305 Editorial, supra note 303, at 271.
306See Editorial, As We Advance, 32 J. ACCT. 203, 203 (1921).
307 See, e.g., id.
298
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of friends 'back home' seeking the prestige of federal
increasing number
308
registration."
Throughout the 1920s, the AIA was plagued with internal strife. State
societies of public accountants united to form a competing national group,
the American Society of Certified Public Accountants. 30 9 The leadership
of the profession was embattled and it lacked a national voice. 310 The AIA
continued to profess high ideals, struggling with the rhetoric and its
practical application. 3 11 In this new rhetoric, professions were still the key
to progress and freedom but the meaning of both terms had changed. They
now denoted a kind of humane individualism. 3 12 In the new zeitgeist, the
professions would seek to prevent businessmen from becoming wealthy
"through fraud upon the humble," which would in turn, they argued,
benefit the country as a whole.31 3
During the Roaring Twenties, the discourse of public accountants
moved further away from talk of a public ethic.314 As the twenties wore
on, more and more trade groups developed their own uniform systems of
accounts. 3 15 Regulated industries worked with government regulators to
refine these accounting rules. 3 16 Just as the FTC largely abandoned its
aspirations as regulator in favor of a new role as business adviser, so too
gather information on costs to help
public accountants assisted businesses
3 17
voluntarily.
competition
control
Accountants began to criticize the idea of independent audits as
Hoover's associationalist state emerged.3 18 In the early twenties, the AIA
308

Editorial, FederalRegistration ofAccountants, 29 J. ACCT. 301, 301 (1920).

309 PREvrrs & DUBIS MERINO, supra note 13, at 242-43.
310

Id. at 242-46.
The articles appearing in the Journal of Accountancy on ethics are countless. See, e.g., Herbert
F. French, ProfessionalEthics, 36 J. ACCT. 81, 81-82 (1923); Carl H. Nau, The Aims of the Institute,
31 J. ACCT. 321, 322-25 (1921); Bernard Rose, Responsibility of Auditors, 35 J. ACCT. 335, 335-37
(1923); Report of the Presidentof the American Institute ofAccounts, 34 J. ACCT. 241, 245-46 (1922).
312 This vision was expressed by a former justice of the Supreme Court for the District
of
Columbia before the annual meeting of the AIA in 1923. See J. Harry Covington, Some Professional
Obligations,36 J. ACCT. 417, 417-20 (1923); see also Editorial, Legislative Draftsmen Needed, 40 J.
ACCT. 112, 112 (1925) (arguing that all laws ought to "protect ... the sanctity of individualism").
313See Covington, supranote 312, at 419.
314
See infra notes 327-36 and accompanying text.
315 See, e.g., Chester R. Union, Uniform Accounting in the Textile Industry, 29 J. ACCT. 104, 105
311

(1920) (arguing that a uniform accounting system would benefit the textile industry). A uniform
system of accounts referred to a standardized format and set of classifications to guide businesses
within a particular type of industry in the presentation of financial statements. Anthony B. Manning,
Advantages of Uniform Accounting, 28 J. ACCT. 113, 113-16 (1919). The belief was that this sort of
standardization would allow government regulators or anyone else interested in financial statements to
compare the financial position and operational performance of different businesses within one industry.
Id. at 31116-18.
6See id at 113-16; Union, supra note 315, at 104-10.
317 PREViTs & DUBIS MERINO, supra note 13, at 239.
318 See id at 249-50.
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still argued that the government should require independent audits of all
public corporations. 31 9 Some continued to suggest that the United States
320
adopt the British system, in which shareholders elect the auditor.
However, as it encountered a deaf ear in government, the profession turned
its attention to bankers, attempting to persuade them that it was
in their
321
interest to require independent audits of all financial statements.
In the years following World War I, Congress passed increasingly
complex tax schemes and -accountants helped businesses prepare their
taxes.322 Many of these accountants became lobbyists on their clients'
behalf, arguing, for example, that the tax burden was too high.32 3 In fact,
the profession gained the greatest recognition in this new field of tax
accounting. 324 To the great approval of the profession, the Treasury
Department ultimately required that all accountants that practiced before it
abide by the ethical rules designed by the AiA. 325 Accountants lobbied for
a board for taxpayer appeals. The AIA argued that members of the board
should be lawyers, accountants, economists, and businessmen, and it
complained bitterly when civil servants from the Treasury Department won
most of the appointments instead.32 6
Having failed to secure a role for themselves in government or through
federal recognition, accountants refashioned themselves as business
consultants and aides to management. 32 7 As one accountant concluded,
accountants should not become too involved in politics: if the profession
were to become too intimately involved in politics, it would not be able to
remain "non-partisan." 328 In an article that reads like an etiquette book of
319 See Editorial, Displacing the Auditor, 32 J. ACCT. 128, 128 (1921) (emphasizing the need for

an "impartial accountant" to act as a liaison between businesses and the public).
320 Id. at 128-29.

321 John Raymond Wildman, CertifiedFinancialStatements as a Basis for Credit, 30 J. ACCT.

161, 164-68 (1920).
322See Elijah W. Sells, Why Not Lessen the Evils of Present Taxation?, 32 J. ACCT. 161, 161-62
(1921).

323Editorial, ProposedTax Legislation, 37 J. ACCT. 109, 109-10 (1924).
324 See

Sells, supra note 322, at 161.

Elijah Sells, a prominent leader in the profession, stated,

"[b]usiness is the very lifeblood of the nation." Id.at 162.
325 See Editorial, Ethics in Tax Practice, 37 J. ACCT. 35, 35 (1924). The Treasury Department
Circular 230 stated that any conduct inconsistent with the AIA codes of ethical conduct would justify
rejection of an application to practice before the Treasury Department and also warrant revocation of
such registration. See Carl H. Nau, Growth of ProfessionalEthics, 37 J. ACCT. 1, 8 (1924).
326 Editorial, Board of Tax Appeals, 38 J. ACCT. 205, 205 (1924); Frank Lowson, Federal Tax
Board of Appeals, 37 J. ACCT. 183, 183-86 (1924).
327 See Editorial, Accounting and Good Management, 37 J. ACCT. 37, 37 (1924); A.R. Erskine,
Importance ofAccounting to Management,38 J. AccT. 107, 107-08 (1924) (noting that the accounting
profession had primarily only been recognized by the state governments, but that accountants were now
very valuable to businesses). As they aligned more closely with their clients, the AIA began to argue
for a privilege that would render communications between accountants and their clients confidential.
See Editorial, Communications Must be Confidential, 39 J. ACCT. 134, 134 (1925); Editorial,
Privilegedwith a Vengeance, 38 J. ACCT. 46, 46-47 (1924).
328j. Arthur Marvin, Public Service of the Public Accountant, 37 J. ACCT. 187, 190 (1924) (also
arguing that accountants should become more involved with serving the public by helping the
government "solve their taxing and accounting problems").
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the period, J. Hugh Jackson suggested that the primary role of the
accountant was to assist management: "an accountant can often guide but
seldom drive." 329 The most important attribute, he continued, was
"personality," or, to be more specific, "[h]abits of speech, dress, and
personal tidiness." 330 A good accountant was "pleasing to those with
whom he comes in contact," and his fundamental goal was to make himself
liked.3 31
In 1926, Arthur Andersen-the prominent accountant and founder of
the accounting firm of the same name-developed a plan to implement the
ideal of the accountant as business advisor.33 2 He argued that accountants
should constantly look for "newer and broader fields of service to business
management." 333
In a prophetic moment, Anderson envisioned
accountants consulting in all matters of business. He concluded: "It is in
bringing a balanced view to bear upon the problems of the undertaking and
in assisting management in matters of business analysis that the accountant
will have [the] greatest opportunities . .. ."334 The service ideal of the
profession evolved from devotion to the common good to submission to
the will of management. 335 To be fair, at the time, the two were thought to
be consistent if not the same.336
As accountants grew more dependent on business and more closely
aligned with management, the AIA demanded federally mandated audits
33 7
by independent accountants, which they had shunned only years earlier.
The irony did not go unnoticed at the time. Herbert C. Freeman, a public
accountant, argued for independent audits, reasoning that accountants
should restrict themselves to serving the investor.338
Otherwise,
accountants cannot get recognition "as a distinct class in the business
community, vested with quasi-judicial functions, if they are known in point
of fact to have affiliations of a closer character in certain directions which
329 j.Hugh Jackson, Accountancy as a Profession: What Opportunities Does it Offer for a
Professional Career?, 40 J. ACCT. 161, 166 (1925).
330 Id. For a discussion of the cultural shift in focus from character-traits of self-restraint and

morality-to personality-an emphasis on appearance and affability, see WARREN 1. SUSMAN,
CULTURE AS HISTORY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN SOCIETY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

271-85 (1984).
331id.
332

See Arthur Andersen, The Accountant's Function as a Business Advisor, 41 J. ACCT. 17, 18-

21(1926).
113 Id. at

334

17.

Id.at21.
335See Jackson, supra note 329, at 165.
336 See id. at 165-66 (noting that whether or not an accountant acts as a public accountant or
works individually with one business, the accountant is providing a useful social service).
331See A. Lowes Dickenson, Publicity in IndustrialAccounts: With a Comparison of the English
and American Methods, 38 J. ACT 254, 254-62, 265-74 (1924); Editorial, The Next Step, 38 J. ACCT.
366 (1924).
338Herbert C. Freeman, Some Thoughts on Modern Tendencies, 39 J. ACCT. 361, 362-66 (1925).
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render them,
in turn, more or less dependent cogs in the economic
339
machine."
Others, however, disagreed with Freeman, arguing that a good
340
accountant inevitably renders business advice in the course of an audit.
Accountants were not the only ones to notice the tension between their
practical function as business advisors and the need for independent audits.
Many critics condemned accountants for conducting poor audits, rubberstamping the wishes of management and justifying their findings with
vague and imprecise accounting rules.34 '
Commercial bankers and
academics led the assault. 342 It is not surprising that commentators
perceived the tension at this point in history, because an accountant's role
as business advisor was becoming 343
more fundamental just as demands for
independent audits were increasing.
Perhaps the most important attack on the profession came from
William Z. Ripley, a professor of political economy at Harvard. 3 " In
1926, Ripley published a series of articles in the Atlantic Monthly, which
were later collected and published in a book, Main Street and Wall
Street.345 Ripley explained that with the advent of popular ownership of
corporations, "Main Street and Wall Street have come to cross one another
at right angles." 346 Extending this metaphor, he warned that the lack of
transparency in accounts casts a dark shadow over that intersection, all but
ensuring a collision. 347 He continued to lament the current state of
accounting, characterized by deceptive practices.348 Some companies
issued balance sheets and no income statement. 349 Others failed to charge
35
for depreciation or obscured the distinction between capital and income. 0
Ripley spent page after page chronicling the mockery that corporate
disclosures had become. 35 1 He concluded by praising those industries that
voluntarily enforced transparency and the New York Stock Exchange for
319 Id. at
340W.C.

366.
Heaton, Development of Modern Practice,40 J. ACcT. 108, 108-09 (1925).
341See Miranti, supranote 64, at 456.
342 Id.
343 WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET (1927). See also supra notes 327-36
and accompanying text.
3- John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the
Separationof Ownership and Control, III YALE L.J. 1, 38 (2001).
345RIPLEY, supra note 343 (1927).
346William C. Ripley, Stop! Look! Listen: The Shareholder'sRight to Adequate Information, 138
ATLANTIC MONTHLY 380, 380-81 (1926).
347Id.
348

Id.

349A balance sheet provides a snapshot of a company's financial condition at a particular moment

in time. It includes assets, liabilities and net worth. An income statement, on the other hand, shows a
company's worth-sales, expenses, and net profit-for a given period of time. BARTON E. FERST &
STANLEY D. FERST, BASIC ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 29-30, 89 (3d ed. 1975).
350Ripley, supranote 346, at 386-88.
311Id. at 381-94.
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its rigorous listing requirements.352 But Ripley recognized those reforms
could go only so far.353 The panacea in Great Britain had been the
independent audit, conducted at the expense of the corporation but under
the supervision of the shareholders. 354 Ripley, however, did not suggest
that the British system be transplanted to the United States. 35 5 He
concluded instead that in America the FTC should conduct audits of all
corporations sold to the public. 356 Without drawing too much attention to
his premise that American public accountants were too docile for the job,
Ripley alluded357to the "American practice of subserviency of the audit to
management."
In an address at the annual meeting of the AIA, George 0. May, a
leader of the profession, responded to Ripley's allegations.35 8 He began,
remarkably, by acknowledging that perhaps auditors had not done all that
they could do to ensure transparency. 35 He then denounced Ripley's
conclusion that the government should assume responsibility for audits and
developed a strategy for addressing the problem. 360 He suggested that the
New York Stock Exchange should take the lead by setting clear obligations
for the auditor and developing distinct standards for balance sheets and
Ultimately, May joined with prominent
income statements. 36 1
leaders, and educators to sponsor research
government
businessmen,
through the Social Science Research Council aimed at determining specific
solutions to the problem of inadequate corporate transpaency.3 62 May
chaired this committee, shaping the agenda of the group and363by 1928, the
majority of members favored limited government regulation.
Operating under the new threat of government control, the accounting
profession began to actively seek another solution. The AIA approached
the New York Stock Exchange proposing a joint effort to develop
The Exchange initially declined,
minimum disclosure standards. 364
concerned that some companies would choose to be listed on another
exchange rather than face such scrutiny. 365 Despite its initial failures, the
352

Id.

353

Id.
Id. at 396-97.
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311 Id. at 390.
356

Id.

357 RIPLEY,

supra note 343, at 143.

358George 0. May, CorporatePublicity and the Auditor, 42 J. ACCT. 321, 321 (1926).
359id.
36 0

See id. at 323-24.
324.
362Miranti, supranote 64, at 457.
363
Id. at 458.
364CAREY, supra note 175, at 163.
365See id. at 163--64; see also PARRISH, supra note 2, at 40-41.
361Id. at
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AIA continued to push for voluntary cooperation by industry combined
with stock exchange regulations rather than government mandated
audits.366 As one editorial put it, "American accountants have always
championed the cause of business in opposition to excessive interference
by government authorities, and [the profession] would not be inclined to
change [its] position merely
because [its] practice might be augmented by
367
a paternalistic innovation."
During this period, the courts were slow to recognize the massive
power of the auditor and the tendency for abuse. During the 1920s, the law
offered very little protection to vulnerable third parties, such as
investors.368 The political economist A.A. Berle noted that courts viewed
accountants as neutral and would not question accounting practices. 369 In
1931, Justice Cardozo, who was then serving on the New York Court of
Appeals, issued an opinion largely confirming that view. 370 He insisted
that accountants could be held liable to third parties only for gross
negligence tantamount to fraud.3 7 ' In Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, the
plaintiff, who lent money to a company on the basis of its fraudulent
financial report, sued the accountants for certifying the statement.3 72 In
rendering his opinion, Cardozo analogized to the negligent manufacture of
chattel, musing about whether he could recognize an injury that rested on
"the explosive power resident in words." 373 He determined that a court
could not hold accountants liable to the investor for negligence but
concluded that such sloppiness could be used as evidence of fraud: "Even
an opinion, especially an opinion by an expert, may be found to be
fraudulent if the grounds supporting it are so flimsy as to lead to the
conclusion that there was no genuine belief back of it. ' 374 Despite his
somewhat conservative holding, Cardozo gave judicial voice to the
growing consensus that accountants had a special power and a special
obligation to the public, and that harm could result from words that were
buttressed by the reputation of a professional. The only ones to disavow
this position seemed to be the accountants themselves.3 75
36 CAREY,

supra note 175, at 164.

367Editorial, A Statutory Audit?, 47 J. AccT. 134, 134-35 (1929).
368A.A. Berle, Management Power and Stockholders Property, 5 HARv. Bus. REv. 424, 424-32
(1927).
369 PREVrrS & DuBis MERINO, supra note 13, at 272 (citing Berle, supra note 368, at 428).
370

See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 , 442, 445 (N.Y. 1931).

71Id.at 449.
372Id.at 443. The AIA filed an amicus brief in the case, arguing that there should be no liability
where there is no privity of contract. Editorial, Institute's Brief on Privity of Interest, 50 J. AcCT. 88,
88-97 (1930).
171Ultramares Corp., 174 N.E. at 445.
374

Id.at 447.

...See infra Part II.B.4.
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4. New Responsibility in the New Deal Order
It was at this inauspicious moment that the accounting profession won
its greatest victory-federal recognition. Immediately before the Great
Crash, the Federal Reserve Board asked the AIA to revise the accounting
procedures published in 1928 and issued the new version as The
Verification of Financial Statements.376 In the midst of the economic
crisis, accountants used this pamphlet as a bible, claiming that it would
ensure fair audits, while simultaneously protecting accountants from unfair
liability. 37 7 As long as they stuck to the rules, no one could blame them for
a faulty audit. 378 Throughout the late twenties and early thirties, the vast
majority of corporations chose to have their annual reports audited by
independent accountants. 379 Finally, in 1933, the New York Stock
Exchange announced that all 38
public
companies listed on the exchange must
0
submit to independent audits.
Efforts at self-regulation could not deter the new administration, as
President Roosevelt considered securities regulation among his greatest
priorities. 38 ' And once again, as in the Progressive Era, the federal
government did not consult accountants in drafting the laws that might
affect them.382 Initially, Roosevelt assigned the bill to Samuel Untermyer,
counsel for the Pujo "Money Trust" hearings in 1912.383 Despite his good
intentions, Untermyer's draft constituted nothing more than a refurbished
version of an old proposal for Post Office supervision of stock and bond
sales. 384 Roosevelt then delegated responsibility to Huston Thompson, a
former FTC chairman, to draft a new version.3 85 While Untemyer's
376Editorial, Verification of FinancialStatements, 49 J. ACCT. 44, 44 (1930).

311See Editorial, Standards to ProtectProfession, 49 J. AcCT. 45, 45-46 (1930).
378Editorial, StandardsAlso Assist Good Business, 49 J. ACCT. 46, 46-47 (1930).
379 SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 48. A survey conducted by the New York State Society of
Certified Public Accountants concluded that in 1931, 83% of all companies listed on the New York
Stock Exchange had their annual reports audited by an independent public accountant. Roger Barton,
Independent Audits for Investors, 56 J. AcCT. 91, 94 (1933).
80See PREVITS & DUBIS MERINO, supra note 13, at 273.
SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 52.
382See id at 52-53.
381

383Id. at 51.

Arsrne Pujo, a United States Congressman, was the chair of the Committee on

Banking and Currency in 1912 when he received permission to investigate the Money Trust. Cynthia
A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112
HARv. L. REV. 1197, 1213 n.72 (1999). After a spectacular interrogation of J.P. Morgan by the
committee's counsel, Samuel Untermeyer, the Commission concluded that a few men had gained an
unhealthy control of the nation's money and credit. Jerry W. Markham, Accountants Make Miserable
Policemen: Rethinking Federal Securities Laws, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 725, 735 (2003).
This investigation helped usher in the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 and the Clayton Antitrust Act the
following year. SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 51.
314SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 51-52.
385Id. at 50, 52.
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proposal was too mild, Thompson's draft proved too drastic. Among other
things, the bill would have empowered the FTC to determine whether an
issuing company was unsound or insolvent, a scheme that was almost
universally condemned.386 The notion that the federal government would
pass on the soundness of securities was too radical a form of government
control. The specter of socialism loomed large. 387 Perhaps the greatest
problem with the bill was that it was self-enforcing. While it gave
substantial authority to the FTC to revoke an issue, Thompson's draft was
fairly short and simple, demonstrating his faith in legislative solutions
rather than creative administration. 388 Thompson's bill was, nonetheless,
introduced in Congress.389
Not only did the administration fail to recruit the help of accountants to
design the bill, but the profession was also strangely absent from the
congressional hearings.390 Perhaps, the AIA feared that any public
appearance would draw attention to the accounting scandals that had been
unearthed by Ferdinand Pecora's investigation of stock exchange
practices. 39 1 Or, maybe the professional organ still held hope that
cooperation with the New York Stock Exchange would derail the federal
regulatory efforts. 392 As the Thompson bill moved through Congress, the
AIA did not so much as make an appearance.393 Only Colonel Arthur H.
Carter, managing partner of the accounting firm Haskins & Sells, testified
before the Senate Banking Committee on behalf of the New York State
Society of Certified Public Accountants.39 4 Carter praised the Thompson
bill, but argued that public accountants should be395responsible for auditing
financial statements, not a crew of federal agents.
During his testimony, Carter and Senator Barkley engaged in the
following somewhat comical, somewhat predictable exchange regarding
the relationship between the public accountant and the company's chief
accountant, or the controller:
Senator Barkley:
Mr. Carter:

You audit the controllers?
Yes, the public accountant audits
the controller's account.

3s6 Id. at 54, 56.
387Opposition

to the bill also focused on the liability provision, which provided for recovery only

from promoters, directors and officers. Id at 56.
38s PARRISH, supra note 2, at 51.
389 SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 53.
390CAREY, supra note 175, at 183.
391See supra note 3 (describing the Pecora hearings).
392See CAREY, supra note 175, at 182-83.
391See id. at 183.
394 Id. at 184-85.
391See id.at 185.
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Senator Barkley:
Mr. Carter:

Who audits you?396
Our conscience.

The Senator seemed bewildered. Carter argued that the government
simply could not do the job--it was too inefficient and clumsy. 3 97 Senator
Reynolds then took up the topic. He pressed Carter about why the
government could not do the audit by itself, especially if it were to hire the
auditors from the New York Society of Public Accountants itself.398 Carter
replied, "I do not think the type of men who are in the public practice of
accountancy would leave their present practice to go in the government
employ. 399 Reynolds responded, "if it were sufficiently remunerative they
would. ' 4 °° Carter had to agree. 4 0 1 Thompson's bill was criticized from all
sides. Banking, business, and most of the senators considered it too
radical. °2
Although professional accountants had not helped draft the Thompson
bill, Roosevelt called in a different sort of professional for the next round.
James Landis, who at the time was a professor at Harvard Law School,
represented a new wing of the Democratic Party, the quasi-professional
academic expert. Fueled with optimism about the power and flexibility of
the administrative framework, Landis remained suspicious of the
businessman's capacity to serve as the guardian of the public good.4 °3 The
"brain trust" version of the securities laws differed from its failed
predecessors in providing for independent non-government audits of all
financial statements. Far from embracing a blind faith in the profession,
Landis's version extended broad liability to the accountants and other
professionals who lent their names to the financial report. 4°4 According to
Landis, Thompson's bill suffered from a fundamental misconception of the
nature of regulation. 40 5 Thompson assumed that corporations and directors
issued securities, so the government could prevent abuse by disciplining
those same corporations and directors. 6 Landis understood that modem
business and financial activities already involved a series of interacting
396 Securities Act: Hearings on S. 875 Before the Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong. I
(1933) (statement of Col. A. H. Carter), reprintedin 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT
OF 1933 AND THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1934, at 58 (J.S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar, eds., 1973).
397See id.

" Id. at 58-59.
3
99Id. at59.
440
id.
Id.
PARRISH, supra note 2, at 53, 56.

401
402

4 03

Id. at 57, 60-61.

404 The Act imposed liability, but gave defendants the right to the affirmative defense, for which

they bore the burden of proof, that they had exercised due diligence. SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 70.
405 See PARRISH, supra note 2, at 63 (indicating that Landis's April 10 proposal was a "new
departure" and that the Thompson bill's major defect was its conception of regulation).
4061id.
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functions of various professional and private groups, such as the New York
Stock Exchange and investment bankers. 40° He understood that these
private bodies already "regulated" each other.40 8 To have any impact, the
legislation would have to reach each of these interrelated groups. 4°9 Unlike
Thompson, Landis's version delegated broad authority to the FTC. His
mentor Frankfurter had argued that this sort of legislation would prevent
evasion and encourage creative administration. 4 10 The new version sailed
through both
houses. On May 27, the Securities Act of 1933 was passed
4 1'
law.
into
It is not entirely clear why Landis and his colleagues advocated the
independent audits, even if coupled with the strong liability provision. In
the nation's experience thus far, the government agency, the ICC, had
conducted audits itself.41 2 The most likely explanation is that the drafters
of the new securities act were aware of the reality captured by Colonel
Carter. The government would have had a hard time recruiting a core of
trained experts large enough to audit all publicly traded corporations, as
public accountants simply would not have given up their lucrative private
practice to become federal agents.
But, there must have been something more, because that point should
have been apparent to Thompson as it was to Carter and Landis. Landis
was a student of Frankfurter and a Brandeis clerk.4 13 Brandeis's tenet that
big business was bad had distilled over time, but the theory at its core
survived.414 Landis was the administrative state's strongest ally, 4 Is but he
was also wary of power, skeptical of the concentration of authority in any
one place. 4 16 The legislation he proposed therefore, created another circle
of influence, a check on government and a check on business-a miniature
system of checks and balances designed to ensure the liberty and security
of individuals in the modem industrial world. 417 Landis did not believe
that the accounting profession was inherently more independent than
407 Id. (noting that the Frankfurter group, of which Landis was a member, understood this general

principle).
4MSee
4 Id.

id

410Id. at 62 (citing Felix Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PENN. L. REV. 614,
616,618, 620 (1927)).
4' PARRISH, supra note 2, at 66, 69-70.
41, See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
413MCCRAW, supra note 54, at 156-57.
414

See NELSON LLOYD DAWSON, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, FELIX FRANKFURTER, AND THE NEW

DEAL 14-17, 21, 24 (1980) (describing Brandeis' distaste for bigness and noting that Frankfurter
himself grew to dislike bigness, but to a lesser extent than his mentor); DONALD A. RITCHIE, JAMES M.
LANDIS: DEAN OF THE REGULATORS 24 (1980) (noting that Landis too had inherited this dislike of
bigness).
415See, e.g., Louis L. Jaffee, Foreword to LANDIS, supra note 23, at vii, vii.
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RITCHIE, supra note 1, at 24.
417 LANDIS, supra note 23, at 1-5, 11-12.
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experts.4 18

government
He did not have any more faith in the accountant
than he did in the bureaucrat, but he did have faith in expertise and in the
power of legislation to direct that expertise, thus the strong liability
provision.4 19 And so, he tried to foster an independent profession, a check
on business and a check on government. He tried to give birth to a new
legislative creature.
The profession was not so pleased with its reincarnation. Rather than
celebrate their new prestige, accountants expressed horror at the Act's
liability provisions. 2 The federal recognition in the form of the mandated
audits seemed to pass almost unnoticed. The professional journal did not
highlight accountants' new responsibility, but focused almost exclusively
on the unprecedented liability. 421 To everyone's surprise the rest of the
decade witnessed a new d6tente. The second securities act made moderate
changes to the liability provisions of the first, and Joseph P. Kennedy, the
chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and James
Landis, its influential new commissioner, proved both sympathetic to
business and willing to defer to the accounting profession.4 22
The era of good feeling, however, was short-lived. The securities acts
created an odd dynamic, an adversarial relationship between accountants
and government coupled with a theoretic partnership between the two
against business. Unsurprisingly, it was the former that survived. The
legislation was grafted onto a profession that had allied with business over
the course of a decade, a profession whose public ethic never emerged
fully formed. There were moments in the history of the profession when
accountants seemed to court the government, loudly asserting its devotion
to the public good, but they were largely scorned. The government never
truly accepted the accountant into its ranks. The profession never became
a permanent force within the new regulatory state except perhaps with
regard to taxation where the profession clearly represented business
interests rather than the public.
III. CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO THE EXPERT
ROLE IN GOVERNANCE

In the immediate wake of legal realism, New Deal liberals justified the
administrative state by virtue of its reliance on expertise, not courts or
411 Id. at 40-42, 98-100.
411Id; James Landis, Significance ofAdministrative Commissions, 12 IND. L.J. 471,475 (1937).
420SELIGMAN, supra note 3,
421 Fredrick B. Andres, The

at 72.
Public Accountant and the Investing Public, 57 J. ACCT. 55 (1934);

Editorial, Liability of Auditors, 86 J. ACCT. 86 (1934); George 0. May, The Position of Accountants
Under the SecuritiesAct, 57 J. ACCT. 9 (1934); Nicholas Waterhouse, Liability ofAuditors, 57 J. ACCT.
92 (1934).
422CAREY, supranote 175, at 194-95; MCCRAw, supra note 54, at 179, 188-89.
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politicians. Expertise would ensure that regulation served the public good
rather than any particular interest. Landis did not, however, envision a
technocracy. He believed that experts would suffuse both business and
government. They would serve politicians and businessmen, guiding both
toward a better world. Landis never forgot that power, even in the hands
of experts, corrupts. His intellectual ties to Frankfurter and Brandeis were
not so attenuated that he lost sight of the value of smallness, the virtue of
competition. Landis believed that private businesses would learn to
consult professionals who would help them regulate themselves. The
government would actually shrink as groups of private and semi-public
actors took the helm.
The purpose of requiring independent audits as part of the Securities
Act of 1933 was to divide power among groups-business, government,
and accountants-so they would constitute checks, one upon another. The
Securities Act attempted to create another zone of power, separating what
might otherwise concentrate in the hands of the government or of business
itself. Landis's faith in expertise, however, was not completely blind. He
knew that public accountants were fallible. He was doubtless aware of the
numerous accounting scandals recounted before the Senate Committee on
Banking and Commerce during the Pecora hearings. After all, those
hearings were taking place at the same time he was drafting the Securities
Act. Perhaps, Landis felt that the severe liability provisions would ensure
that accountants did their part. He certainly believed that the huge public
responsibility bestowed on the profession would inspire a sense of civic
obligation. The Securities Act of 1933, however, grafted this new
responsibility on a profession that had never developed a true public ethic
and, in the previous decade, had grown deeply tied to its business clients.
The mere fact of the new responsibility and the fear of liability could not
change this historical context.
This section uses the history of regulation and the accounting
profession to suggest a new way of looking at regulation in general and the
accounting profession in particular. It is fashionable to argue that private
and semi-public bodies should have a greater role in regulation. This
Article suggests that the reliance on private and semi-public bodies to
govern is not as new or innovative as some of these scholars suggest. To
the contrary, this sort of arrangement is as old as the regulatory state itself.
Landis explicitly analyzed the trend toward private regulation in the early
stages of the New Deal and relied on experts, in part, because unlike
courts, they could supervise private regulation. The contemporary private
governance literature dispenses with expertise-which has been long since
discredited 423 as justification for administrative agencies, but ironically still
relies, at least at times, on the professions to ensure that regulation serves a
423See

Stewart, supra note 31, at 1702-03, 1711.
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public purpose.
By unearthing the historical roots of the private
governance literature, this Article helps illuminate what is in fact new
about the scholarship. A series of articles, each examining a different
instance of how private parties govern, is useful not because it announces a
new trend, but rather because it helps us assess whether this sort of
regulation by private bodies is desirable in a given area and if so, what
means we can use in that particular context to ensure that those private
bodies are serving the public rather than a particular private interest.
Second, this section suggests a new way of looking at the regulation of
gatekeepers-the modem-day professionals who serve investors by
preparing or certifying corporate disclosures. To serve the function
intended by Landis and his successors, 425 the accounting profession must
be independent. It cannot be subsumed by business or politics. The
history of the accounting profession suggests that independence is not
simply a personal quality of individual professionals but denotes an ethic
that is developed over time. Government attitudes toward business
regulation and the profession can have a profound effect on the ethic of the
profession as a whole. By bestowing special status on the accounting
profession, the Securities Act of 1933 attempted to create a professional
association suspended between business and government. 426 Of course, to
do so, the legislators had no choice but to rely on the existing professional
association. But, the professional body, which had been struggling to
define itself for half-a-century was not so easily converted. The
profession's identity developed over time in a slow give-and-take with
government. By suggesting that the social norms of a profession are
responsive to government regulation, the history of the profession offers a
new way to look at the independence rules of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002.
A. Private Governance
The flurry of articles proclaiming a crisis in the administrative state has
reached a heightened pitch. The most recent trend, known as "private
governance," proposes a return to a more decentralized private regulatory
structure. 42 7 While proponents of private governance are diverse, they
424 Freeman,

Private Role in Public Governance, supra note 30, at 586, 615. See generally

Vandenbergh, supra note 30 (detailing the influence of private entities on public regulations).
423See supra Part i.
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Globalization,2 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 515,553 (2004).
427See John F. Duffy, The FCC and the Patent System: ProgressiveIdeals, JacksonianRealism
and the Technology of Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1071 (2000) (recognizing that recent critiques
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seem to share a commitment to certain premises and certain values. For
one, the private governance scholars envision a world in which private and
public power blend. They embrace the increased role that private parties
play in the regulatory structure and urge delegating more public functions
to private individuals and shrinking government control. In this new
private governance model, the government will rely more and more on
negotiation between public and private parties and on agreements between
role for courts and
private parties. These scholars advocate a smaller
428
action.
agency
constraining
of
modes
traditional
Private governance scholars recognize that turning to private parties to
regulate and dispensing with traditional checks on agency discretion leaves
a bit of a vacuum. Who or what will ensure that private parties are acting
on behalf of the public good rather than their own private interests?
Scholars seem to frame this as a question of "accountability. ' 429 What is
really at issue, however, is how to make this system serve the public rather
than a private interest. Some suggest that the market will ensure that
regulation works properly. 4 30 Others propose that government include
terms in contracts entered into with private parties that require them to live
up to certain standards.4 3 ' Some scholars argue that by providing every
interested party with information, and making sure that everyone has a role
in the decision-making process, we will ensure that the public interest is
like private
served.4 32 Still others suggest that semi-public groups 433
accrediting bodies and professions will guide private behavior.
The private governance literature proclaims that privatization (or
"publicization," to use Jody Freeman's term) 434 is a fundamental shift from
the New Deal approach. For instance, one private-governance scholar goes
so far as to characterize the New Deal as "a paradigm shift in the American
polity. '435 She suggests that "in the context of world war and economic
depression, law was conceptualized as national, top-down, and sanctioned.
Governance, supra note 30; Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116
HARV. L. REv. (2003) [hereinafter Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms]; Freeman, The PrivateRole
in Public Governance, supra note 30; Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the
Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REv. 342 (2004); Gillian Metzger,
Privatizationas Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003); Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M.
lacobucci, Privatizationand Accountability, 116 HARv. L. REv. 1422 (2003). This list is in no way a
comprehensive account of all private governance scholars but it does provide a summary of some
aspects that these scholars share.
428 See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization,Democracy, and the Need for a New Administrative
Law, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1687, 1688-90 (2002).
429See, e.g., Edward Rubin, The Myth ofAccountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103
MICH. L. REv. 2073 (2005).
430Trebilcock & lacobucci, supra note 427, at 1423-24, 1447.
431Freeman, The PrivateRole in Public Governance, supra note 30, at 587.
432 Aman, supra note 428, at 1709; Doff & Sabel, supra note 30, at 319-20; Freeman,
CollaborativeGovernance, supranote 30, at 22.
433See Freeman, The PrivateRole in Public Governance,supra note 30, at 614.
434Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms, supra note 427, at 1285.
435Lobel, supra note 427, at 344.
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The New Deal regulatory model sought to consolidate formerly dispersed
powers into the newly founded expert regulatory agencies and to direct
economic and social activities at the national level. ' ' 36 In fact, the New
Deal was not so simple; its authors were not so na'fve. James Landis, for
example, like the private governance scholars, recognized that the theoretic
distinction between private and public bodies was more fictional than
real. 4 " He too felt that regulation by private bodies was no different than
regulation by government officials.4 38 He too considered the problems of
concentrating power in a politically-appointed body and recognized that
private parties regulate themselves to a great extent regardless of
theoretical commitments to the contrary. He too worried that agencies
staffed with experts might not serve the public as they should. 439 And
because the architects of the New Deal did not believe that judicial review
was the appropriate means of constraining agency discretion, Landis
thought to use the public accounting profession to prevent factions,
creating new checks and balances to fill the void left by courts and
judges. 440 He imagined a world in which government would constrict as
private parties all consulted professionals whose expertise would guide
them toward the common good. 44 1
That said, the private governance model does not replicate the
regulatory schemes that came before it. Most importantly, contemporary
scholars have, at least on the surface, abandoned the faith in expertise that
animated the early New Deal." 2 The current vision of collaboration and
private regulation involves not just experts, but almost everyone.
Teachers, land owners, and police associations might be part of a private
governance system, something which would have seemed alien to Landis
seventy years ago, involving every interested party in the design and
implementation, monitoring, and oversight of rules. 443 Without the
justification of expertise, the literature on private governance suggests
alternate forms of accountability. The market, expanded participation in
rule-making, private law, or a renewed commitment to professional bodies
might help ensure that the vast and complex private interactions serve
public rather than private ends. 444
436

Id. See also Vandenbergh, supranote 30, at 2035-37.

437 See supra notes 165-71 and accompanying text.
438 See supra notes 165-71 and accompanying text.
439 See LANDIS, supra note 23, at 98-100; supra notes 165-71 and accompanying text.
440 See HORWITZ, supra note 19, at 216-17.
44' Supra Part II.A.
442

Stewart, supranote 31, at 1682-83.

443Freeman, The PrivateRole in Public Governance, supra note 30, at 548.
4" See supra notes 430-33 and accompanying text.
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Highlighting what is new about the literature helps to evaluate it.
Landis recognized and analyzed the reality of private regulation in 1933.
By arguing that this part of their theory is revolutionary, the private
governance scholars distract from what is, in fact, new about their
scholarship. By exploring the details of how private parties regulate
themselves in different contexts, private governance scholars are beginning
to develop an eclectic theory of accountability. They are beginning to
observe that in each regulatory situation, it is appropriate to take different
measures to ensure that the administrative state is working well. At times,
it will be appropriate to rely on professional associations; 44 5 at others, the
market will ensure the correct result. 44 6 Depending on the context, the
government might control private regulation by adding terms to a
contract 44 7 or in other instances, it might involve more voices in the rule
making process. 448 The nature of presidential, congressional, or judicial
oversight of agency decisions might change once we acknowledge the role
that private parties play in any given situation. 4 4 9 It is important, as a
result, to do exactly what the private governance literature is doing:
how private parties govern
understand how regulation works, including
450
each other, in each regulatory context.
Evaluating how private parties or semi-public associations govern each
other involves certain dangers that require a detailed, and most importantly
historical, understanding of each different context. As the title of this
Article implies, just as different scholars and commentators have had
different views at different times about which branch of government is the
most dangerous, 45 1 so too with professions. The accounting profession is
the villain of the early 21 st century but other professions may well take its
place.
Of course, in this light, private governance literature begs the question
of how to determine what accountability means once we have resigned
ourselves to the fact that no one body-whether the courts or the market or
professionals-has a monopoly on defining a transcendent public good.452
Perhaps, the private governance literature exposes a modern predicament:
"5 See Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, supra note 30, at 610.
446See Trebilcock & lacobucci, supra note 427, at 1424, 1447.

" See Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, supra note 30, at 634-35 (discussing the
checks on private prisons due to their contractual relationship).
448See Freeman, Collaborative Governance, supra note 30, at 30-31 (suggesting a "collaborative

regime" to facilitate agency accountability).
449Vandenbergh, supra note 30, at 2036-37.
450 For a particularly good example of this

sort of fine-tuning to develop new mechanisms of

accountability and transparency suited to the private parties involved, see Cristie Ford, Toward a New
Model ofSecurities Law Enforcement, 57 ADMIN. L. REv. 757, 758-62 (2005).
411 Compare ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT

AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1975), with Martin H. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L. J.

1725, 1727-31 (1996) (discussing the migrating nature of this accusation).

452See Rubin, supra note 429 at 2121-22 (criticizing the use of the term "accountability" to

denote legitimacy); Stewart, supra note 31, at 1712-13.
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once we recognize that there is no one ascertainable public good, we are
forced to be pragmatic in our approach. Abandoning the hope for an
overarching theory to justify the administrative state, we can still explore
some old
each situation and choose from an eclectic mixture of theories,
453
and some new, to ensure that regulation works as well as it can.
B. Regulating the Gatekeepers
Relying on professions may not always be misplaced but the
professional status of key players is certainly no guarantee that we will
achieve what is best for society. Rather, for professions to serve the public
good, they must be independent. Drawing on the rhetoric of civic
republicanism, the professions in America have always aspired to a high
ideal. They have justified their role by proclaiming their independence
from both government and industry. 454 Like the citizen in the civic
republican polity, the professional would suppress his own self-interest in
pursuit of the common good. Independence was not something that could
be created by government mandate. Quite the contrary, it was a necessary
prerequisite to participation in the public sphere. 45 5 While it is true that the
rhetoric of professional ethics is just that, rhetoric, the reality of an
independent profession is necessary to make Landis's scheme make sense.
The profession cannot constitute a separate check on government and
business unless it occupies a space in between.
Recent scandals, like the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and Global
Crossing, have proven that liability provisions and any analogous efforts to
punish individual wrongdoers, no matter how extreme, might not
accomplish this ultimate goal. This is not to say that we should abandon
efforts to increase enforcement and stiffen penalties but rather that such
efforts alone might not create an independent profession that will serve to
diffuse state and market power. In fact, common sense would suggest that
excessive liability provisions simply reinforce the public consensus that the
153 Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel use pragmatism in a very different way. They conclude that a
pragmatic approach to government would involve what they call "democratic experimentalism," in
which Congress states broad objectives without specifying the means of achieving these ends and
various local communities are encouraged to find local solutions to the problem. Doff & Sabel, supra
note 30, at 343.
454 See Gordon, supra note 290, at 60-61.
455Historians and lawyers have argued about the relative importance of civic republicanism at the
time of revolution. For a review of this debate, see Flaherty, supra note 21, at 590; Daniel T. Rodgers,
Republicanism: The Career of a Concept, 79 J. AM. HIST. 11 (1992). While most historians agree that
the importance of republicanism as an animating political theory had waned by the turn of the
eighteenth century, this article examines republicanism as a discourse-a way of understanding the role
of the individual and the community-rather than its importance as a political theory. Republican
rhetoric emerges in different contexts throughout American history. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 290,
at 52-53, 56 (describing the views of the legal profession toward a republican polity throughout
history).
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profession is not to be trusted, that it cannot act independently of the
business interests it represents.
In 2002, in response to the recent accounting scandals, Congress
passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 456 The Act protects shareholders and
investors by regulating corporate governance and policing financial
disclosures. In particular, the Act contains provisions designed to regulate
gatekeepers. 4 7 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act repeats the exact irony of the
1933 Act-a reliance on a profession that is deemed, in the same
legislative utterance, unreliable. That is, the Act perpetuates our reliance
on public accountants while simultaneously imposing new constraints on
the profession. Born of a distrust of accountants, it tightens the screws and
sharpens the punishment of individual accountants while relying on the
profession to preserve the public good. In this respect, it is no different
from the Securities Acts of 1933.
At the same time, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act implements some
significant changes. These provisions, known as the independence rules,
are designed to dissociate accountants from business interests, to create
new incentives for individual accountants to resist the temptation to serve
management blindly. 458 While this is, no doubt, an important goal, the
history of the profession suggests that the problem is deeper, not residing
with individual accountants but with the profession as a whole.
Independence is not merely a state of mind of individual accountants but
also the result of a public ethic that a profession develops over time in
relation to the government and the public. Legislation itself cannot
transform a profession that has become the right hand of management into
a tool of the public overnight. By pointing to how government exclusion
of the profession contributed to its development as business advisor, the
history of the accounting profession suggests that the best way to
encourage such radical change will be to design regulation that helps create
a public ethic among accountants. 459 Unless legislation is aimed at
reforming the profession as a whole, we are at risk that individual
accountants, even if their incentives are structured in individual
456Sarbanes-Oxley

Act of 2002 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections

of titles 11, 15, 18,28 and 29 U.S.C.).
457 The literature on the role of gatekeepers in the corporate scandals of the early part of the
decade is growing. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers,
Stupid," 57 Bus. LAW. 1403 (2002); Jonathan Macey & Hillary A. Sale, Observations on the Role of
Commodification, Independence, and Governance in the Accounting Industry, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1167
(2003). Some conclude that our reliance on professionals has been misplaced. Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth
Rosen, Is There a Role for Lawyers in PreventingFuture Enrons?, 48 VtLL. L. REV. 1097 (2003).
458Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 103(b).
459 Some scholars have argued that we abandon the entire structure of reliance on public
accountants. Peter K.M. Chan, Breakingthe Market's Dependenceon Independence:An Alternative to
the "Independent" Outside Auditor, 9 FORDHAM J. CoRP. & FIN. L. 347, 351-54 (2004); Lawrence A.
Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers: The Financial Statement Insurance Alternative to Auditor
Liability, 52 UCLA L. REV. 413, 415 (2004).
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transactions to be independent of the business interest they represent, will
still fail to exercise the requisite neutrality.
Title II of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act contains provisions that are
designed to create auditor independence.460 When analyzing the wisdom
of these provisions, commentators should focus not simply on empirical
evidence regarding individual market incentives, but also on their ability
shape the environment in which accountants operate such that the
accounting profession could ultimately crawl out from under the control of
management. If these provisions succeed in meeting this goal, the
profession could develop the public ethic that it so desperately lacks.
For example, Section 201 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act restricts audit
companies from providing certain non-audit services to their clients. 46 ,
These services include financial information system design and
implementation, appraisal or valuation services, actuarial services, internal
auditing services, investment banking services, legal and expert services
unrelated to the audit, and brokerage services. 462 The provision provides a
stark deviation from historic practice, as Arthur Anderson himself, as early
as 1926, championed the idea of the accountant as business adviser.463 He
listed all sorts of consulting services that an auditor could provide to render
him indispensable to his client. 464 The rationale behind reversing this
trend, which Anderson evidently did not appreciate, is that the large fees
from non-audit services compromise auditor independence by giving
465
accountants incentive to acquiesce in managers' misconduct.
Professor Roberta Romano has criticized these provisions, based on
her examination of empirical studies concluding that "audit quality-and
' 66
hence auditor independence-is not jeopardized by non-audit services. A
The flaw in this criticism, however, is that she elides the independence of
an individual auditor in the course of an individual transaction with the
independence of the profession as a whole. Romano assumes that
independence denotes the state of mind of the individual audit partner or
the members of the audit team. 467 The provision of non-audit services,
however, might not directly correlate with the decline in audit quality in an
audit engagement. It might not necessarily compromise the integrity of the
individual auditor, but it seems likely that it promotes a relationship
460 Elliot J. Weiss, Some Thoughts on an Agenda for the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board, 53 DUKE L.J. 491,497 (2003).
461Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 201.
462For the rules designed to implement this new prohibition, see 17 C.F.R. § 210.2 (2005).
463Andersen, supra note 332, at 17.

464Id.
465 Roberta

Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance,

114 YALE L. J.1521, 1533-34 (2005).
466 Id. at
467id.
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between the client and the auditor, which, over time, contributes to a
professional identity as business adviser rather than public servant. By
altering the nature of the relationship between client and auditor, the
statutory scheme can possibly
contribute to independence by shaping the
468
future of the profession.
Another way in which the Sarbanes-Oxley Act seeks to ensure auditor
independence is to mandate the rotation of lead and concurring audit
partners every five years. 469 SEC rules implementing this section also
limit other partners to a seven-year rotation period. 470 Again, the rotation
requirement is aimed at individual accountants not the development of the
profession as a whole. It presumably helps deter a close relationship
between an accountant and his client that might lead an individual auditor
into temptation to act improperly. 4 7 1 But it is hard to imagine how this
provision will help instill a public ethic among accountants. In fact, this
rule could be counterproductive as well. The rule assumes that auditors
cannot and should not be trusted. While that may be the case at this
particular juncture, a rule that so explicitly writes the distrust into the law
seems to undermine the development of professional independence rather
than encourage it. It is hard, for instance, to imagine such a rule applying
to lawyers; it simply seems anathema to the lawyer's role as a professional.
By treating accountants as less than a profession in such an obvious way,
the rule threatens to fulfill the prophecy. It is a constant reminder to both
the public and the accountant himself that the system does not trust him;
that we assume that left to his own devices he will be lured into corruption
by management.
In addition to mandating individual auditor rotation, the SarbanesOxley Act also requires the SEC to investigate and report on the value of
going so far as to require firm rotation. 472 Proponents have argued that
firm rotation would both weaken the tie between an auditor and his client
and encourage more conservative accounting, given that the accounting
would eventually be reviewed by a new firm of accountants. 473 While this
provision would treat the profession as unreliable in a very public way, it
also fosters the sort of self-regulation that is supposedly critical for
professional independence.474
468Coffee,

supranote 457, at 1404-05.
469Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 203.
470 Regulation S-X, § 2-01 (C)(6), 17 C.F.R. § 210.2 (2006).
471 Whether it does even this remains to be seen. See Macey & Sale, supra note 457, at 1168
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 207.
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474 See W. Bradley Wendel, Nonlegal Regulation of the Legal Profession: Social Norms in
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Beyond enacting such "auditor-independence" provisions, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act also creates a quasi-governmental body, the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), to set auditing standards
and review and discipline auditing firms.4 75 Whereas under the Securities
Act of 1933, government, business, the accounting profession, investment
banks, and lawyers would theoretically work as checks on each other, this
new board essentially adds another layer to Landis's structure. The
PCAOB serves as an additional check, a new organization of experts to
regulate a profession that has grown too deeply tied to its business clients
to ensure that power does not concentrate too dangerously in business or in
government.
The Act significantly deprives the accounting profession (the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants or AICPA) of the
ability to dictate auditing standards and delegates the responsibility to the
new PCAOB. In fact, only two of the five members of the PCAOB can be
certified public accountants. 476 Unlike the rotation rules, the new board is
a structural change directed at the entire profession, rather than merely
individual participants. It might serve to refocus the profession on public
service by engaging accountants in a partnership with the SEC, which has
historically been more focused on transparency in the markets and service
to the public.
In some ways, Landis was prescient and in others he seems quite
He predicted the growing importance of private parties in
na've.
governance but he also believed that by directing the professions attention
toward this newly acquired public purpose, he could train them to serve a
public good. He understood that power corrupts and designed a system in
which professional experts would provide another check on that power, but
he did not fully comprehend that expertise itself was susceptible to such
corruption. If we are to ensure some degree of legitimacy in a system in
which, as Landis observed, private parties govern each other then we will
likely have to rely on experts to some extent. We should not, however, do
so without being mindful of historical context. Before we imbue a
profession or expert body with some critical responsibility, we should
examine it in both its present capacity and its past to understand whether it
will be able to provide an independent check on market forces. Otherwise,
we might find ourselves, as we now do with regard to public accountants,
relying on a profession that is inherently unreliable.
415 Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 101-09.
476
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IV. CONCLUSION

In the wake of the Lochner era, the demise of economic substantive
due process effectively undermined the Court's role in regulating the
economy. Legal Realists had revealed that judges were doing the same
things as legislators, but they were doing it poorly. They were making
policy decisions without any of the expertise or information necessary to
do so. But, if the judiciary was no longer responsible for defining the laws
in this realm, who was? Frankfurter, Landis, and his colleagues responded
that experts within the new administrative state would take over this
responsibility. Experts were valuable not just for their technocratic
knowledge but also for their neutrality. They would develop rules based
on cold hard facts that would govern the governors. The judicial rule of
law no longer sufficed but practical solutions derived from expert
knowledge would create "postulates"--as Landis put it-that would police
the boundaries of state action and the limits of freedom. While Landis had
a great and almost religious faith in science, he inherited his mentors'
suspicion of power and he attempted to diffuse that power by creating, or
recognizing, quasi-public bodies to mediate between business and
government. Government would not fully regulate business and business
would not run government. Instead, the two would engage in a dialogue
mediated by the supposedly independent accounting profession. The
profession, at least theoretically, would ensure that party politics and
business self-interest gave way to the common good.
In The Least Dangerous Branch, Alexander Bickel famously began a
debate concerning the accountability of the judicial branch.47 7 Modem
commentators have borrowed this phrase to describe, and critique, the
administrative state.4 78 Born of a desire to replace, or mitigate, the power
of the courts with the neutrality and expertise of administrative agencies,
the administrative state too has been criticized, most recently in the private
governance circles, as suffering from similar flaws. These scholars have
argued that courts should sit on the sidelines, and that private actors should
take their place among the bureaucrats. They have argued that we should
reconceive accountability, view it in terms of a dialogue, a system of
checks, between different private, public, and quasi-public groups. But
what these scholars overlook, in their quest to empower private and quasipublic bodies within the administrative state is that their idea is not new; in
fact, reliance on the quasi-public accounting profession, among other
private actors, was a cornerstone of the Securities Act of 1933.
Of course, the accounting scandals of the past five years suggest that
the accounting profession-initially viewed as an antidote to the
477BICKEL, supra note 451.
478
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judiciary-has not proven itself to be up to the task of replacing courts as
the neutral arbiters of the laws regulating business; some might say they
were no less dangerous. In fact, as history shows, the accounting
profession was never up to the task that Landis proposed for it. Landis's
administrative scheme relied on an independent profession to occupy a
space in between the public and the private in order to mediate between the
two. The accounting profession, however, had grown so deeply tied to its
business clients that it has failed as the independent voice it was expected
to be.
Where does the history of the accounting profession leave us? Some
may argue for an extreme approach, that public accountants should cease
to play a significant role in the regulation of business, and should be
replaced by a class of bureaucrats, government-employed accountants.
Others might argue for the placement of strong constraints on accountants,
coupled with strict oversight. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, like the
1933 Act, clearly hews closer to the latter approach.
But the wisdom of the measures adopted by Sarbanes-Oxley must be
measured with an eye towards history. As Landis hoped, the accounting
profession can provide a buffer between government and business only if it
is a true profession, independent of both. And short-term attempts to
ensure the independence of accountants-independence understood as the
independence of particular accountants from particular business interests
during particular representations-through measures such as firm and
accountant rotation may have a drastic unintended effect. That is, such
measures, born of a distrust of accountants, may create a self-fulfilling
prophecy that will undermine the professional ethic of accountants, and
thus undermine the true independence of the accounting profession,
understood as its capability to serve neither business nor government
interests. The history of the accounting profession shows both the
elusiveness and the necessity of striving to meet this goal.
That said, another moral of the historical story is that government
regulation has an effect on the identity of the profession. Legislative
attempts to steer the profession in one direction or another might well
accomplish the desired goal. Scholars of legal ethics tend to view the
debate in stark terms: either we regulate the profession through the
traditional means or we defer to communal norms within the profession.4 79
The history of the accounting profession belies this assumption. If
regulations are directed at the profession as a whole, rather than individual
members, they might well contribute to shaping the norms or ethic of a
profession.
479 Wendel, supra note 473, at 1956-69.

